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ABSTRACT
Matthew Arnold I s Culture and Anarchy questions and
discusses the opinions of politicians, clergy, and
educators in a unique rhetorical style. This thesis
eXami'18S Arnold's rhetorical style by examining the
specJ.fic strategies that Arnold used to create a special
relationship with the reader. Arnold's use of these
strategies and his rhetorical method are traced back to
his knowledge of German literature, specifically to
Goethe, and the process through which he wrote Culture and
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INTRODUCTION
Matthew Arnold's polemical text, CUlture an(l Anarchy,
reflects Arnold's views on the politics and social
structure of mid-nineteenth century Britain (Trillin9' 230-
233: Chesterton 29-32). In order to express those views in
what Arnold called a "receivable manner," (~ 1:315)
he developed a unique style (Gates 124-129; Holloway 202-
207: Ohmann 308), one which he hoped would encourage the
reader to define culture broadly (Gates 142).
Arnold's style claimed the attention of critics
immediately. Lewis Gates in 1899, a mere eleven years
after Arnold's death, says: "Admirers of Arnold's prose
find it well to admit frankly that his style has an
unfortunate knack of exciting prejUdice" (124). Having
pronounced on Arnold's style, Gates discusses Arnold's
purpose, which he believes to be a spiritually
regenerative one:
The purpose with which Arnold writes is ,lOW
fairly apparent. His aim is to shape in happy
fashion the lives of his fellows; to free them
from the bonds that the struggle for existence
imposes upon them spiritually, and to call all
that is best within them into as vivid playas
possible. (151)
More recently, Lionel Trilling tells readers that Arnold's
purpose becomes united with his style when his ambition is
to teach history "dialectically":
The anbivalence of opinion which the dialectical
method produces is an impossible burden to some
people but to others it is a positive pleasure;
Arnold was one of the latter. (165)
Although we may agree with Trilling that the dialectical
method is not a burden to Arnold, it proves to be an
insurmountable one to some at. his critics. For instance,
T.S. Eliot charges that Arnold lacks the "power of
connected reasoning at any length: his flights are either
short flights or circular flights" (~ 431) and are,
therefore, impossible to understand.
G.K. Chesterton maintains, however, that Arnold's
style is his most important contribution to literature
because it 1s:
founded on the patient unravelling of the
tangled Victorian ideas, as if they were matted
under a coiDb. He did not mind how elaboratel)'
long he made a sentence, as long as he made it
clear. (31)
Although T.S. Eliot's argument is that Arnold did not make
his sentences clear, Chesterton believes that Arnold is
dedicated to clear communication and that he uses
repetition: "repeating Whole phrases word for word in the
same sentence," in order not to risk "ambiguity by
abbreviation" (31).
Recent critical work on Arnold I s style explores his
intricate arguments, his rhetorical manipulation of
opponents, and his use of a number of prose strategies
more commonly thought tt.l belong to fiction than to
polemics. One of the first critics to discuss some of
these rhetorical strategies at length, John Holloway
describes Arnold's style of persuasion as
"prestidigitation," a magician's sleight of hand, and
explains the manner in which this style is employed to
disarm his opponents:
To a degree quite unusual among polemical
writers, Arnolu's persuasive energy goes to
build up, little by little, an intimate and a
favourable impression of his own personality as
an author, and an unfavourable impression,
equally clear if less intimate and more
generalized, of the personalities of his
opponents. Over and over again one finds the
discussion taking shape between these two poles.
(207)
Holloway's description of Arnold's ability to make himself
seem very agreeable to the reader while making his
opponents seem less agreeable is augmented by Geoffrey
Tillotson's view that Arnold is able to balance these two
impressions without causing anyone pain:
To read him is to watch a performance of one who
comes near to inflicting pain either without
actually doing so, or with ointment so smartly
applied that the sting melts away. (114)
While Holloway and Tillotson emphasize Arnold's ability to
jUdge and manage the reactions of his reader, William
Buckler emphasizes Arnold's ability to create an emotional
bond with his reader, as a poet would:
Arnold employed the manner of the modern poet:
he made his point dramatically, evocatively,
accretively, metaphorically, and so successfully
that many of those ....ho have mis~onceived the
manner have nonetheless felt its inherent force.
(f..rQ.g 89)
All of these discussions emphasize Arnold's distinctive
style and ability. Richard Ohmann believes that Arnold ~as
able to develop his style partly from his knowledge of a
wide range of literature, and partly from the forces that
were quickly changing the world order. Ohmann cautions,
however, that the changes affected writers in
substantially different ....ays. He says that "[w]riters in
a given period may share large parts of a conceptual
scheme and a large number of emotional needs produced by
CUlture, without sharing a style" (308). He then goes on
to explain that "even the feeblest intuition of style
tells us that Arnold's is very different f"om Newman's,
Newman's from carlyle's, and .'iO on" (308).
Although critics generally agrpl;! that Arnold has a
unique rhetorical style, they do not fully discuss the
possible sources of his style. One of the widely
acknowledged great influences on Arnold's life is Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe, an eighteenth century German writer.
His influence on Arnold's writing, although acknowledged
(DeLaura Hebrew 182-191), has not been traced through
Arnold's many of Arnold's works, s lch as Culture and
Anarchy. This thesis explores Arnold's use of one
rhetorical strategy, his courtship of the aUdience. which
reflects Goethe's influence over Arnold I s style.
In chapter one I review the development of~
and Anarchy from serialized essays into the text with
.....hich readers are familiar todl."Y. I argue that Arnold's
development of the text is critical to his management of
his reader's reaction to his ideas.
In chapter two I investigate Arnold' s intellectual
tie to t"e German philosopher-writer, Goethe, whose method
of revolutionizing the narrative form profoundly
influences Arnold's work. His admiration for the writing
and philosophy of Goethe is an important link to the
reader's understanding of Arnold' 5 prose method.
The third chapter begins an ",;.:ploration of courtship:
a strategy Arnold would have been introduced to when
reading Goethe'S novels, and one he himself then uses to
unify the text and befriend the audience. The "courtship"
is an essential relationship for the writer to have with
thE' reader, if the reader is to be kept open to morally
and philosophically challenging questions.
In chapter four, flStrategies and Socrates," I explore
Arnold's focus on Socrates' maxim "Know thyself," which is
also a theme within Goethe's work. Throughout Culture and
AlliU:Qhy, Arnold raises questions about "Hebraism'!
(Nonconformist protestantism) and "Hellenism"
(Classicism), education, Irish Home Rule, and progress.
Arnold frequently approaches these issues through
questions that open the issues and invite the reader's
reflection on them. In order to discuss his rhetorical
method and the role Socrates' maxim plays within thOlt
method, I use passages from Arnold's chapter "Hebraism and
Hellenism," as well as passages from the political
arguments he includes throughout the text of ell) ture and
~.
In chapter :rive, I explore Arnold's ability to create
"J::Gpresentative characters," who seem to be both realistic
and stereotypical at the same time. His creation of
"representative characters" serves the purpose of
distancing his reader from the "real-life" people these.
characters represent.. Since the reader is observing
"action" between "characters" in the text, rather than
engaging with the author's point of view directly, slhe is
more likely to be open to new ideas and perspectives.
Arnold's use of represent.ative characters allows him to
avoid alienating the reader, while gaining the reader' s
trust:.
CHAPTER 1
THE TEXT'S GENESIS
Matthew ArOlo!d cre.\tes Culture and Anarchy by
revising essays he had previously written and published.
Each essay that he uses had been published in ~rnhill
magazine, and the controversial nature of the essays
caused many readers '':0 respond with essays of their own.
Arnold used the comments and responses he received to help
him to form his next argument. After all of the essays
had been published individually in Cornhi 11 magazine, he
revised them extensively, then published them as~
~. Although Culture and Anarchy is a text that
w-as created from serially published essays, his revision~
create a text that gives the reader a single, unified
impression.
In order to appreciate the care Arnold takes with
the text, it is important to know something about the
nature of its serialized parts. The series of artiCles
that first appeared was published under the titles
"Culture and Its Enemies" (JUly 1867) and "Anarchy and
Authority" (in five parts: January, February, June, July,
and August, 1868). After these articles appeared, Arnold
significantly changed them by deleting large sections that
did not fit with his conception of the finished work.. The
revisions finally resulted in the 1869 edition of the
text. Arnold continued to revise the book, and the second
edition of the text appeared in 1875 (Brown 17). Between
1875 and 1932, the second edition was the one in common
use. Then, in 1932, J.Oaver Wilson reintroduced Arnold's
first edition:1
But Culture and Anarchy is now a classic; the
shrinking flesh flicked on the raw by its
original "vivacities II has long been compounded
with the dust; and though many of the names and
allusions omitted in 1875 are ten times more
forgotten in 1931, the rediscovery of them often
gives point to Arncld's argument and helps us to
understand the mood in which he wrote. (Wilson
"Preface" vii)
E.K. Brown's (1935) account of Arnold's revisions of
the serialized essays reveals the nature and scope of his
changes. 2 According to Brown, Arnold makes alterations
intended to unify the text. For example, in the first
publication of the essay that would later become Q!ll.Y.ll
and Anarchy's first chapter "Sweetness and Light," Brown
tells his reader that Arnold retains in the original
edition a speech he delivered as Poetry Chair at Oxford.
When Arnold begins to pull the essays together to form the
text for the book, however, Brown says Arnold makes
substantial changes to that speech (18). For example, he
deletes a section that refers to a specific time and
place:
On this, the last occasion that I am to speak
from this place, I have permitted myself, in
justifying culture and in enforcing the reasons
for it, to keep chiefly on ground where I am at
one with the central instinct and sympathy of
OXford. (Brown 18)
He omits references to specific places, such as Oxford, in
order to make his text applicable to all places and times.
If he had retained this section in CUlture and Anarchy, he
would have jeopardized the close relationsh1p he builds
with his reader, since his reader may not have been at
Oxford on that occasion. The specific details he does
retain in culture and Anarchy, such as Bishop Wilson's
l1axims and speeches given by the Liberals, are built into
the text so that they become part of the experience shared
by the narrator with the reader.
Arnold's changes to the 1869 text are also intended
to "lighten the burden of posterity" by eliminating
specific names:
"sir William Page Wood" becomes "an experienced
and distinguished chancery Judge"; "Mr. Bright's
brother, Mr Jacob Bright" becomes IIsome more
ordinary man"; "Mr Bazley" becomes "our friend"
and "our middle-class member of Parliamant";
"the Rev. W. Cassel" whose nama Arnold learned
to be "Cattle" becomes, before Arnold's blood is
up, "a Dissenting minister from Walsall" or,
"this Walsall gentleman," then "our truculent
middle-class Dissenting minister, II "our
fanatical Protestant." (Brown 27)
Brown notes that although much good writing is
"suppressed" when Arnold aliminates passages, the revision
is nece~sary because "Exquisite structure, conducing to an
emphatic dod distinct total-impression, . . . was for
Matthew Arnold the condition of excellence in poetry and,
in truth, in prose as well" (Brown 20). In other words, to
Arnold "excellence" is achieved if the whole text affects
the reader' 5 thinking, not merely a few individual satires
or anecdotes.
For this reason, Arnold suppresses several satirical
passages, such as the following, from his revised~
~' In these passages Arnold is using satire to
discredit others' opinions, whereas in Culture and Anarchy
he prefers to debate with his opponents rather than
discredit them. By presenting another person's views in a
seemingly fair and straightforward manner, without any
satirical tone, he can air their views, or challenge them,
ei ther method then acting as a catalyst for the reader' s
own re-education. If, on the other hand, Arnold had
included from his essays passages such as the following
summary of Frederic Harrison's manifesto against culture,
he would have jeopardized the dialectic he was attempting
to create throughout the text:
Fo",:, example, in that very same powerful
ma· dfesto in which Mr Frederic Harrison
cr iticized CUlture, he spoke of "every hopeful
movement being met with the shriek of
superstition"; he spoke of the "bigotry of
priests and sectaries"; he spoke of the "ancient
iniquities unabated"; he spoke of the "men who
care for pUblic good wearied out or hunt:ed
down." (Brown 21)
His deci sian to eliminate passages such as those
above culminated in a work that develops its argument
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slowly, through many turns. As Arnold develops his
argument, he is also constantly asking the reader to
question many popul.:::.r moral and political views. Each
chapter of the text poses an argument against one or more
or those views, such as his questions about the "good"
that "machinery" would bring to the people in the face of
the peoples' strongly held belief that "machinery"
represented progress and therefore a good thing. Arnold's
arguments, however, are never straightforward combat: they
are circular, anecdotal approaches, intended to encourage
the reader to keep reading. Thio method suggests that
Arnold is baing true. to his self-professed purpose to
create a "seed sown in the thoughts of the young and fair-
.linded, the effect of which will be gradual but
persistent" (1&..t..t!U:§. 2: 1:l4) .
Brown's exallples of Arnold's careful revision and
formidable deletions reveal the amount of care and
attention Arnold gave to re-making his essays into an
entirely new text. From this perspective Park Honan seells
guilty of an understatement when, in his biography of
Arnold, he summarizes Arnold's revision of the essays into
culture and Anarchy with the folloving comment: "Gathering
up his .QQX..I:!b.i.ll pieces, he pUblished them on Monday,
January 25, 1869, as Culture and Anarchy· An Essay in
Political and Social criticism" (Honan 350). Honan's claim
that Arnold ltlerely "gather[s] up" the essays ignores
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Arnold's commitment to the book. and his belief that
Culture and Anarchy "would have a considerable ef,fect in
the end, and the chapters on Hellenism and Hebraism
{being] ... in the main, ... so true that they will
form a kind of centre for English thought and speculation
on matters treated in them" (~ 2:11).
In his determination to write something that would
have a "considerable effect," Arnold seems not to have
questioned the usefulness of his method; rather he S8ems
to have been determined to approach the issues contained
within Culture and Anarchy in his own way, whether others.
agreed with his methOd or not. One \oIho disagreed with his
method is his mother, and to her he said on February 3,
1866, that "there are certain things which it needs great
dexterity to say in a receivable llIanner at all, and what I
had to say I could only get said, to my thinking, in the
manner I have said it" (Letters 1:315).
Arnold's style and expression in culture and Anarchy
seem to have achieved \oIhat he intended: they have kept his
readers talking and writing about his text. Holloway says
that through the "whole experience of reading him" one is
able to "sense" Arnold's ability to "mediate" a "habit of
mind" which opens possibilities for understanding the
world (207). The care he takes seems aimed at providing
his reader with endless encouragement to search "inwardlyll
12
for a personal conviction. William Courthope complains, in
an essay entitled "Modern culture (1874) that Arnold:
... will not satisfy us. On the contrary,
....henever he seems on the point of making a
practical suggestion, he shrinks from applying
it. (212)
Arnold was probably very pleased by that criticism.
I have examined in this chapter the genesis of
Culture and Anarchy, a book that has excited controversy
since its publication. The contL'oversy is generally
confined to Arnold's political, religious, and social
views, and for some critics occasionally extends to
Arnold's style. To various degrees, most critics would
agree with A.O.J. Cockshut that Arnold was a "brilliant
rhetoricianu (168) and would agree with Ohmann that
Arnold's style was "very different" (308) from Ne'Wll\an's,
Carlyle's, and from oth~" 'Victorians. What is not as
frequently discussed is 1 am what source Arnold's writing
is primarily influenced.
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CHAPl'ER 2
THE CONTINENTAL INFLUENCE
In chapter one I explored the evolution of the text;
and in the following chapter I will explore the style that
Arnold developed for the text, a style that is best
discussed within the context of eighteenth-century German
developments in prose style.
The German who is central to the changes and
developments in prose style in the late eighteenth century
is Goethe. One of hil? greatest contr5 butions to prose
style is the Bildungsroman, a form of novel that is partly
identified through techniques used to befriend and involve
the reader, as well as to represent ideas. These same
techniques can be seen working in Culture and Anarchy. It
is essential then to appraise Arnold's work within the
context not only of Victorian Britain, but also of the
revolutionary Goethe, and the development of the
Bildungsroman.3
Scholarly scrutiny of Goethe' 5 influence on Arnold,
to date, focuses on Arnold's affinity with Goethe's
philosophy (Simpson, Orrick), and the extent to which
Goethe's ideas are important to other writers whom Arnold
14
also admires, men such as Carlyle or Newman (DeLaura
~ 184). Goethe is almost the only Gennan writer to
remain popular throughout the nineteenth century and his
influence has been pointed out (Ashton 8). Here I briefly
explore the revolutionary development Goethe brings about
in the narrative structure of the novel, and the influence
of that deVelopment, as it can be observed in Culture and
~.
By the time Arnold was eighteen, he had read
carlyle's translation of Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship
and "praised the book's large, liberal view 01: life"
(Honan 68). Within Goethe's liberal view Arnold was able
to find a forn of expression that allowed him room to grow
intellectually. As he grew to be more knowledgeable about
other continental writers, such as George Sand, Joubert,
Flaubert, and Heir-c, he was drawn to them as well. The
intellectual quality of their ....riting attracted him, as
did its way of involving the reader, encouraging him/her
to think. Arnold was aware of the dramatic differences
between the structure of prose written in English and that
written on the Continent, and this awareness led him at
times to be critical of English prose:
How much greater is our nation in poetry than
prose! how much better. in general, do 'the
productions of its spirit shoW in the qualities
of genius than in the qualities of intelligence!
. . . how much more striking, in general, does
15
any Englishman, --of some vigour of mind, but by
no means a poet, --seem in his verse than in his
prose! (~V3 239)
Arnold admires French and German authors to the
extent that his first prose "character," in his "My
Countrymen" essays, is lIrminius Von Thunder-ten-tronckh, a
character drawn, according to R. H. Super, directly from
Heinrich Heine: IIHeine's doctrine [is) Arminius' doctrine
and his style [is] the model for Arnold's irony" (CWA V5
359). Arnold's attachment to things German is evident
throughout his work. Immediately prior to the pUblication
of Culture and Anarchy, Arminius is the pre-eminent voice
in all of Arnold's essays about "culture" and British lack
of "CUlture." Through the character of Arminius, Arnold
could voice his own discontent about British social
structures and education: "' Liberalism and despotisml '
cried the Prussian; 'let us get beyond these fonns and
wards. what unites and separates people now is ~'"
(.QHA VS 41). By "gelst,ll Arnold means intelligence and
the ability to play freely with ideas. Arminius goes on to
explain why Germany, with its people'S geist, is a
superior nation:
We North Germans have worked for~ in our
way, by loving knowledge, by having the best~
educated middle and lower class in the world.
You see what this has just done for us. Franct:
has~ in her democracy, and Prussia in her
e1ucation. Where have you got it? --got it as a
fjrce I mean, and not only in a few scattered
individuals. Your common people is barbarous;
in your middle-class "ungeist" is rampant; and
as for your aristocracy, you know~ is
16
forbidden by nature to flourish in an
aristocracy. (CWA V5 41)
Arnold's belief that the British lacked "geist" appears in
the essay "I rnt:'oduce Arminius and~ to the British
Public" (1866) in Arminius' voice. Later, in Culture and
~, Arnold no longer uses the Arminius persona to
voice his discontent with British "culture."
Although Super attributes Arminius' beliefs to
Heinrich Heine, Arnold t.imself says that Heine's
"doctrine" evolves directly from Goethe's influence:
"Heine is noteworthy, because he is the most important
German successor and continuator of Goethe" (CWA VJ IDS).
The flow and direction of Heine's thinking comes from
Goethe, and it is Goethe who is central to the revolutil"ln
in literary style ",nd technique. Furst says it is Goethe
who began to exploit fully the use of "implication" within
the novel. When something is "implied," "every scrutiny
turns into a contemplation" (Furst 23). Implication within
Culture and Anarchy works to encourage the reader to
reconsider issues and beliefs that have long been accepted
as part of the conventional wisdom.
In Simpson's account of Goethe's influence on Arnold,
he tells us that "when Matthew Arnold went up to Bailiol
in October 1841, Goethe was already more than an obscure
author" (l6). The young Matthew's exposure to Goethe's
work was largely due to the Arnolds' frequent Continental
houseguests who were aware of emerging philosophical and
17
literary trends. Later, when Arnold was at OXford, he read
Carlyle' s translation of Wilhelm Meister which was the
"decisive stimulus in the growth of his interest in
Goethe" (Simpson 17). He is so strongly affected by Goethe
that he said of him "A greater voice still--the greatest
voice of the century--came to us in those youthful years
through Carlyle: the voi::e of Goethe" (CWA V3 108).
Matthew Arnold, during his early years, would have
enthusiastically included himself among the Europeans
philosophically drawn to the notion of "self-cultivation":
thus it seems reasonable to assume he woule! also have been
drawn to the Bildungsroman. Although the Bildungsroman is
generally executed as an apprenticeship novel, complete
with a fallible hero, its purpose is to promote self-
cuI tivation or fonnation wi thin the reader. It is to this
same purpose that Arnold forged culture and Anarchy. He
himself accepts the persona of the fallible hero while he
urges all men to "the goal--the Socratic "Know thysel f' n
(Shaffner 23). Shaffner explains that Goethe "sought to
establish for all men, regardless of class, a new- common
goal, a new- uomo universale. the modern ideal" (23) which
would allow for the "development of all natural gifts to
the highest level of excellence" (22) These high ideals
for all men can be seen throughout Arnold's argulnent for a
different conception of culture.
18
Goethe's development of the archetypal Bildungsrolllan,
Wilhelm Meister, allows the "struggle ll of life to work
itself out within each reader's reading of it. But as one
of the first novels of its kind, it proved to be a
struggle itself for the eighteenth-century reader. Even
the response of Goethe's friend, Freidrich schiller, to a
first draft of Wilhelm Meister expresses a certain amount
of fear that Goethe's book 10'111 be entirely misunderstood
because of the way in which it is written. In a letter, he
tells Goethe:
In the eighth Book you have dropt various hints
of what you wish understood by Apprenticeship
and by Mastership. As the purpose of a work of
fiction is the main consideration, especially
with a pUblic like ours, and is often the only
thing afterwards recollected, it is of
importance that you be here fully understood.
The hints are excellent, only they do not seem
t, me sufficient. You wish the reader himself to
discover Dlore than you directlY impart' '1 him.
But precisely because you do give out E1o~.ething
will it be thought that this is all, and thus
you will have limited your idea more than if you
had left it entirely to the reader to find out.
(correspondenct:! 164)
Schil1er l s fear that thl.! reader will gain only what is
explicit from the novel arises from its experimental
style. He believes that the reader might think that by
understanding the story, slhe has understood the book. He
feels Goethe's complex strategies will so completely
confuse the reader that in the end the reader will have
understood the plot, but missed the point of the s";ory.
Goethe was not moved by Schil1er's fears, however; his
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reply to Schiller was "I find a satisfaction in veiling
trom the ....orld's eyes ... my writings ... and thus to
place myself ... between myself and the manifestation of
myself" (correspondence 167). Goethe's strong reply
defending his method left open to schiller only one
possible response: "In regard to the Novel, you are right
to reject others' views that do not assimilate with your
nature" (Correspondence 177).
Arnold is drawn to Goethe's bold. experimental style
because his prose is not characterized by the
unintellectual "provincialism" (~V3 245) that Arnold
detested in British prose. He admired Goethe's willingness
to take risks. As Goethe pushed against literary
convention. Arnold could see that within a changed
narrative structure there were possibilities for
extracting responses and reactions from readers that
previOUSly had been possible only through poetry. Arnold's
first response to Goethe's work was to translate the
German's ideas into his own journal (1847):
The highest care an author can have for his
Public is that he never should bring them what
they expect, but what he himself at any given
stage of his own growth and that of others,
ho~ds to be right and useful. (Simpson 72)
During this period before the writing of~
AMr£hY. Arnold's poetry often strongly reflected Goethe's
style (Buckler, Dawson). By the time that Arnold pUblished
culture and Anarchy in 1869, Goethe was similarly
'0
influencing both Arnold's method and prose style, and as
oethe had earlier recommended, Arnold would seldom give
the public what it expected.
Arnold's assimilation of Goethe's Bildungsroman is
evident in the stl....ltegies within the structure of~
~ that treat thoa reader as a real presence with
whom the narrator communicates. For instance, he writes in
a conversational style, usually beginning with an
anecdote. He attempts to enoJage the reader in a "play" of
good and evil forces which battle all around, while he, as
persona, and the reader observe. Arnold writes with the
reader "at his side. to He does not use "you" which sounds
instructional when it is combined with such constructions
as "you will" or "you should"; instead, he uses "we."
Throuqh these strategies he shows his assimilation of
Bildungsroman method. That is, he believes that he and
the reader together will experience growth and self-
formation when th~y jointly explore the prcblems all
around them. Although his treatment of po1:ltics and
religion does not reach the level of abstraction found in
Goethe's fiction, Arnold neverthele.;o; employs his variety
of complex strategies to achieve a similar level of self-
reflective inquiry. BC'cause the ':ext that results from
Arnold's strategies is complex, Arnold's reader does often
misunderstand the purpose of the text while still
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understanding that its subject is the moral and political
issues being discussed in the text.
Goethe had also developed the role of the narrator so
that it worked within the text in different ways than it
had before. within a novel like Wilhelm Heister, the hero
not only acts within the events of the story but also
speaks to the reader. Susan Wells describes this as the
hero acting as both "subject and object of the narrative"
(144). She also tells us that lIthis dialectical relation
structures the novel's basic mode of representation"
(144). Within this mode "the novelist repeatedly refers to
his relation to the reader and to the life he narrates,
installing the reader as his jUdge" (144).
Within Culture and Anarchy Arnold exploits the
relatiorship between speaker, speaker-as-character, and
reader, a relationship which Wells refers to as "dialogic"
(143). In other words, Arnold is both the narrator of the
text and is also a character within it because, while he
at times addresses the reader and directs "us" to turn our
attention to some problem, at other times he addresses
the arguments of his other characters, answering their
charges as though he is talking to them. Through these two
methods of dialogue, Arnold communicates with his reader
and encourages him/her to feel involved in the text.
Although within the novel the narrative form reguires
a hero who is able to "show" the reader his life and call
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for the reader's jUdgment, Culture and Anarchy, without
such a hero, is nevertheless able with its narrator
& (Arnold) to compel the reader's participation and
jUdgment. Inst~ad of showing the reader his own life,
Arnold is able to show the reader the reader I s experience
with polit... ..:al tradition and belief, and call for his
reader's jUdgment of that experience. The narrative
"tension" is established by immersing the reader in the
decision-making process, and keeping him/her guessing
about the purpose.
Further applications of the strategies to the text of
the Bildungsroman show that the narrative "tension" is
also created through irony. Arnold is able to establish
narrative tension through irony by maintaining a level of
aesthetic distance. He achieves this distance by making
his narrator seem to be a fiction. His narrative control
gives the reader a sense that Arnold is not so much
telling the reader about what politics in Britain
consists, but, as a character within the narrative, is
showing the reader the political workings of British
society. Through his mastery of the prose narrative fonn,
Arnold controls the "ambiguity" (Furst 13) by showing his
reader issues that are familiar, but discussing them in an
unfamiliar context, thus creating a sense of ambiguous
tentativeness, an "anything can change" tone, within the
text. In this context irony is an integral part of the
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narrative. It is through irony that the narrator is able
to maintain direct control of tone, point of view, and
purpose. Arnold's mastery of the use of irony brings
together disparate strategies that provide a framework for
the essays that compri!';<'" CUlture and Anarchy and so
creates a text that gradually works "to produce a real
effect" (Arnold~ 2:117). or as Brown called it "a
total-impression," either phrase signifying that Arnold
did not intend for his book to merely be a collation of
his essays, but a new text with an aim of its own.
As the Bildungsroman evolved, so too did the pUblic
concept of irony. During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, literary opinion held that irony was
a trope. Even when writing Wilhelp Meister Goethe does not
identify irony as his primary device. Al!ao, alilong other
GerJlll:ln writers there are varying opinions about the nature
of irony. To the Victorians. it is la.rgely
undefinable, and undiscussed. Lillian Furst discusses the
difficulty of identifying and defining irony:
(t]he more closely one examines irony, the more
intractable it proves to be. For its resistance
to definition it fUlly deserves its Ancient
Greek connotation of "sly fox" ... [F)rom
whichever angle irony is approached, it is
always its elusiveness that emerges as its
primary characteristic." (Furst 11)
The perception of irony as a way of seeing, rather than a
liter.lry device, grows simUltaneously with the development
of the Bildungsroman. Furst (Fictions of Romantic Irony)
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articulates the questions that have aboia~'s surrounded
irony:
Is Socratic irony, for instance, a means of
argumentation or an expression of an ontological
vision? Taking it to its utmost extremes, is
irony a rhetorical trope, or is it a
philosophical stance? The second problem
arising out of the notion of the mask concerns
communication: if irony is a form. of
dissembling, how is the listener/reader to
perceive it? (7)
The question of the reader's perception within the mask of
irony is, to some extent, problematic. Schiller's fear
that the reader will misunderstand Goethe' s Hi.lh.e.l.m
~ because it is not a "clear" communication is a
case in paint. Irony is, nevertheless, necessary to the
construction of the Bildunqsroman because through the
development of an ironic distance, the main character is
able to step aside to participate Yith the readers in a
jUdgment of events, and of his/her oyn actions.
During the eighteenth century, the writers who use
irony and expand its role in their narratives do not
analyze their use of it. As Furst says, their notion of
irony is still linked to its use in poetry:
schlegel's concept of irony 1s thus dependent on
his theory of Romantic poetry. . . the dialectic
of its tensions is to permeate every facet of
the aesthetic artifact, shaping its outer and
inner configuration, and this dynamic is to act
as the propellant for the advance towards
transcendence. (Furst 28)
The shaping of "its outer and inner configuration," or
Friedrich Schlegel's experimentation with the words and
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the form, ultimately leads to changes, in Germany and
elsewhere, to the way in which irony is defined. The word
"irony" begins to be used to refer to a broad range of
strategies that a writer might choose, and so it emerges
as something more than a rhetorical trope. Just before
Matthew Arnold came into adulthood, Soren Kierkegaard
pUblished his concept of Irony with Constant Reference to
~ (1841), in an attempt to gather up all the
different uses of irony and bring them together for
discussion. This text evaluates irony's newly perc.:lived
importance within literature, and so forms a wonderful
source of information about the changes which have evolved
within the Bildungsroman. It also provides a useful
synthesis of the many notions of irony, from Socrates
through Fichte (an eighteenth-century Garman philosopher) .
Kierkegaard found it difficult to synthesize others'
perceptions of irony into one coherent concept because
references to irony's use were rare. He says of his search
for unity within the descriptions of irony that "as one
seeks a complete and coherent discussion of this concept,
one will soon convince himself that it has a problematic
history, or to be more precise, no history at all" (261).
He is, nevertheless, sure that within German literature
irony is being used in several different ways to encourage
the reader to a "refl"'.ction on reflection." Primarily
Kierkegaard discusses its use to create an ambiguity of
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meaning, and a mask. within each of these uses milny
devices exist that can produce the desired reflection. He
cautions, though, that "as the concept of irony has so
often acquired a different meaning, it is essential that
one does not come to use it consciously, or unconsciously,
in a wholly arbitrary fashion" (262;. with this caution
in mind then, we should view his Concept as a
concretization of eighteenth-century common knowledge
about irony, not as an attempt arbitrarily to change its
use. As such, it can help to reveal Arnold's knowledge of
the use of irony as it evolves within the Bildungsroman:
as a "reflection on reflection."
Kierkegaard's explol:ation of the ironist· s ability
to free the reader from concrete meaning by creating
ambiguity leads him to a strategy that disrupts the
reader's sense of what is happening in a text. Kierkegaard
says that when aiming to disrupt, the ironist works to
separate the reader from a sense of reality by rendering
ambiguous what is believable in the story. Kierkegaard
defines this as the collapsing of the "actuality, 11 or the
ironist's attempt to be "negatively free." By this he
means that through metaphor and other figurative language,
the ironist is able to play with meaning. He believes
that outside of irony, the ironist is limited by the
meaning of words:
If I am conscious when I speak that what I say
is my meaning . . . and I assume that the person
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with whom I am speaking ':'omprehends perfectly
the meaning . . . then I am bound by what is
said. (264)
Through irony, however, the ironist achieves the opposi to
freedom, a "negative" freedom of not being bound by the
limits of definition and syntax. It is within this
negative freedom, through connotation and context, that
the ironist allows the reader to have a range of
comprehension, encouraging him/her to comprehend
"figuratively, "--"Although it is understood, it is not
directly understood" (265).
For Kierkegaard, irony is also an important
dissembler. He maintains that the ironist can "unmask"
the reader by making himself appear to share the viewpoint
of the reader. In an instance such as this it is the
"ironist's pleasure to seem ensnared by the same prejUdice
imprisoning the other person" (267). In CUlture and
~ Arnold, as narrator, introduces the reader to his
own faultc dS well as quoting his critic's opinions of his
style or behaviour to effect an unmasking. Once he has
seemingly acknowledged his place within the prejudices of
society, he is able Lo work himself and the reader away
from those prejUdices.
According to Kierkegaard' s ~, the ironist is
also successful if s/he can produce reader-confusion
because it is through confusion that the reader works to
make sense of the text, often causing new ideas to emerge
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from traditional ones. Irony for I<ierkegaard, then, is
not a device to "tell," but a concept that has the
potential to "reveal." Rather than argue against an idea,
the ironist in his/her "negative freedom," blocks the
reader's access to conventional thought. Through a guise,
metaphor, or stereotype, the ironist encourages the reader
to think again. S/He wants the reader to "see" again
through a different perspective. The risks the ironist
takes with meaning are similar to those the poet takes;
thus Arnold makes a work such as Culture and Anarchy as
open to interpretation and mis-interpretation as a poem.
For Kierkegaard, the freedom irony gives to the
reader as well as ti.le writer of an ironic work has the
effect of a "cleansing baptism" (339) that leads to
"regeneration" or transformation. The "cleansing baptism"
which Kierkegaard believes is the sUbject and Object of
irony, can also be found as the subject and object of
Arnold's Culture and Anarchy.
Throughout this chapter I have been discussing a
route by which Arnold may have assimilated Goethe' s
strategies well enough for him to have unconsciously
adopted them as a part of his style and rhetorical method.
In the following Chapters I will explore several of the
strategies within Culture and Anarchy that are similar to
those found within the Bi!dungsroman.
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CHAPTER 3
COURTSHIP AND OTHER REIATIONSHIPS
In chapter two, I explored some of the developments
within literature during the eighteenth century that may
have combined to influence Arnold, such as the rhetorical
strategies and devices of a range of eighteenth-century
writers who began to use them to involve the reader in the
text in new and interesting ways. Those strategies relied
heavily upon the writer's mastery of irony and his/her
ability to manipulate the role of the narrator.
In this chapter I will investigate Arnold's
development of one of those strategies, courtship (Burke),
which is a particular kind of relationship between the
narrator in and reader of culture and Anarchy. Arnold
begins building this relationship with the reader in his
preface to the chapters. His need to "court" the goodwill
of the readers stems from his aim to develop a text that
is a dialectic. He elicits that goodwill through the
development of a relationship with the reader that relies
on the reader's sense that s/he and the writer have common
interests and bonds. The reader becomes actively involved
in the text because the writer carefully includes the
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reader through his/her choice of pronouns, e.g., "our" and
"we", and through his/her assumption that the reader has
similar fears and goals. Burke says the purpose of the
relationship is not to truly befriend the reader but to
create the sense of a dialogue between equals from which
the dialectic can occur:
The imagery of courtship in the SOC"'t"atic
education is to be interpreted mythically. Its
primary motives are not positi.·...e, but
dialectical. (Burke,~, 230)
In Arnold's preface he builds this special relationship
with the reader. The reader is invited to join with the
narrator in a discussion of some seemingly insignificant
issue. Through the discussion, because the reader is being
appealed to, s/he is made to feel important. The reader's
sense of importance and belonging then affects his/her
reading of the text and open-mindedness toward the
narrator's raising of controversial topics. This strategy
produces a complex balance between the reader as
protagonist, and the reader as audience. The reader for
Arnold fulfils two roles, s/he acts as the reader of the
text, and as a "synecd,>chic representative" within the
text (Burke, ~, 507). For this reason the
representative reader finds him/herself pUlled into the
text through reader's and narrator's shared background in
Britain's current political upheavals; and Arnold
reinforces the perception of sharing further with his use
Jl
of "our" and "we" to encourage those associations where
they do not naturally form.
From the first sentence of the Preface the reader can
observe Arnold creating a relationship with him/her. He
chooses a seemingly insignificant "point of departure," a
book written by Bishop Wilson, a bishop of Sodor and Man
(1663-1755), to engage the reader in a friendly return to
the past (Culture 213). He vegins the preface with an
introduction to Bishop Wilson:
In the essay which follows, the reader will
often find BishOP Wilson quoted. To 'II1e and to
the members of the Society for Promot :.ng
Christian Knowledge his name and writings are
still, no doubt, familiar. But the world is
fast going away from old-fashioned people of his
sort, and I learnt with consternation lately
from a brilliant and distinguished votary of the
natural sciences, that he had never so much as
heard of Bishop Wilson, that he imagined me to
have invented him . . . In the old times they
used to print and spread abroad Bishop Wilson's
Maxims of Piety and Christianity. The copy of
this work which I use is one of their pUblica-
tions, bearing their imprint, and bound in the
well-known brown calf which they made familiar
to our childhood. (Preface, 3)
This beginning to CUlture and Anarchy disarms the reader'S
potential rejection of Arnold's concept of "CUlture,"
because Arnold does not immediately establish his argument
for a concept of "culture." Instead, he surprises the
reader by arguing for the importance of Bishop Wilson's
~. In this beginning his words are friendly and
inviting to the reader. He begins with a recollection of a
very "conformist tl bishop to create a socratic engagement
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with the reader. Kierkegaard explains this method of
beginning as part at the Socratic method: "Socratic method
found no phenomenon too insignificant to function as a
point of departure for working itself up into a sphere of
thought" \Kierkeqallrd 54). Arnold '5 method of beginning
from some seemingly "insignificant .•. point of
departure" is an "organic" planting of a talliliar
experience which he then nurtures so that it wIll grow.
Buckler explains that Arnold "knew that literature, if it
were to work authentically, must work organically, . . .
(I]t depended on the very broadest, deepest, most
repetitive experience" (Buckler, 5). His intention i..s to
first involve the reader in a story which then takes on
elements of the reader's own life, drawing him/her into
the story, into the text. While involving tho reader in
the story in this way, Arnold also helps the reader to
recall the past which the narrator insists is common to
all of "us": the "well-known brown calf ... familiar to
our childhood." He then pleads for the reprinting of
Bishop Wilson's book, and by doing so seems to let the
reader decide whether or not the~ should be
reprinted. The reader is less likely to feel threatened
when s/he is in control, so Arnold works to give the
reader a sense of some control from the oeglnning of the
preface. A fonr!. relationship with Bishop Wilson is also
created by depicting him as an "old-fashioned" person, and
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a person from "our childhood." As Arnold asks for Bishop
Wilson's book to be reconsidered as a major work, he is
introducing the importance of reviewing past action.
Reviewing the past and reflecting upon what of it was good
or useful becomes, as the text develops, a major objective
in his dialectic. Bishop Wilson· ... 1';"ole as a figure from
the past becomes an anchor to the past as he is recalled
several tilDes to remind readers of the good which is
inherent in the past, in tradition. Thus Arnold uses
Bishop Wilson to foster respect not only for the Bishop as
a clerical figurehead, but also, and simUltaneously, to
foster the reader's respect for tradition. Through this
preface Arnold forms an alliance between himself and the
reader, in order for the reader to feel that slhe is a
friend of the narrator, and is, in a literary sense,
inside the text, actively fUlfilling a role as a co-
conspirator with the narrator.
As Arnold continues in the preface, he works to
strengthen the fledgling relationship he is attempting to
forge with the reader. To do this he wanders into a
discussion of how one should assimilate the values of the
Bishop:
They [Bishop Wilson's I!IA.x.1m..:r.l should be read, as
Joubert says Nicole should be read, with a
direct aim at practice. The reader will leave
on one side things which from the change of time
and from the changed point of view which the
change of time inevitably brings with it, no
longer suit him; enough will remain to serve as
a sample of the very best, perhaps, which our
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nation and race can do in the way of religious
writing. (4)
The uSE'fulness and need to savour from the past a
"sample of the very best" is an idea that Arnold draws
upon, and returns to, several times in the course of
Culture and Anarchy. His comment that the~ should be
read "with a direct aim at practice" encourages his reader
to adopt the ~, keeping them a.:: a part of our present
while regarding them as an immutable part of our past.
Arnold then ends his endorsement of the Bishop's
~ with the following:
with ardour and unction religion, as we all
know, may still be fanatical; with honesty and
good sense, it may still be prosaic; and the
fruit of honesty and good sense united with
ardour and unction is often only a prosaic
religion held fanatically. Bishop Wilson's
eycellence lies in a balance of the four
qualities, and in a fulness and perfection of
them. (5)
He uses the key words "fanatical," and "balance," here to
remind his readers that fanaticism appears not only in
religions at the edge of civilization, but also in
"prosaic" religions. He uses "perfection," which appears
and reappears throughout the text of Culture and Anarchy
as a facet of his definition of "culture," in association
with Bishop Wilson so that the reader might connect the
Bishop and perfection to each other. Later. in his chapter
"Hebraism and Hellenism," he develops the links between
Hel,..raism and fanaticism, and Hellenism and perfection.
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Throughout the discussion of Bishop Wilson' s ~.
Arnold introduces key words, and a key concept, that of
"balance." Since he is also working on his courtship with
the r~ader, he uses the phrase "as we all know" in order
to include the reader in the text. His subtext implies
that Bishop Wilson is "ours" and "we" are losing him
because the modern age no longer pays attention to him or
the Il'any good things he has to offer. Arnold's connecting
of Bishop Wilson to "us" and the past, combines them--the
Bishop, the reader, and the past--so that we understand
that "we" are all together, and about to be overtaken by
anarchy if we do not embrace culture. The connection
between Wilson and Culture becomes even more explicit as,
later in the preface, Arnold develops his definition for
culture which is, in short, "a harmonious perfection," or
the kind of "balance" that dwells within the soul of the
Bishop. Throughout Arnold's exhortation for the~ of
Bishop Wilson, he is also encouraging the reader to care
for the Bishop. He makes him seem to be a part of "our"
shared past, both the narrator's and the reader's. As the
exhortation comes to its conclusion the Bishop's qualities
are described with the same words that Arnold later uses
to define culture. Arnold, it seems, would like the
reader to trailsfer his/her newly acquired fondness for the
Bishop to culture.
J.
As the preface continues and Arnold concludes his
exhortation to save the Bishop's Maxims, he moves into
another arena that is familiar to his reader: he complains
about the Nonconformists. The Ncnconformists in this text
are Arnold's useful ltout-groupU ("in-group/out-group
polarization" is a concept David Kaufer explains). Arnold
works himself into a frenzy of criticism against them, but
they are not his true target. It is those who gUllibly
accept modern "machinery, tl (Arnold' s term for the changes
brought by the Industrial Age) who are his target. In
order to get their attention, he cleverly chooses to
criticize a group of people that most of his target group
dislike and distrust. His criticism of this one group
enables him to polarize the social and economic groups
that comprise society. David Kaufer maintains that "A
speaker can affiliate himself with practically any
audience if he can identify a common enemy" (101).
Al though Arnold wants to reach the Nonconformists, i,.,
order to change them, he finds in the meantime that they
make a perfect Itcommon enemy" whom his other, more
gullible Anglican readers can join with him to scorn.
Arnold's first attack on the common enemy, the
Nonconformists, whom Kaufer calls the "out-group," begins
with his mention of their "antipathy" toward the
"established church." Arnold first claims not to be an
enemy of the "out-group": nCertainly we are no enemies of
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the Nonconformists." But he then shows them to be narrow-
minded and rigidly opposed to social and political change.
Meanwhile, he ingratiates himself with the "in-group," the
established chrch, by saying that rather than shunning the
"out-group II we simply "aim at ..• their perfection" (11).
For Anglicans this alignment affirms the connection
between Anglicanism and perfection. The several threads
that Arnold is weaving begin to make a cloth as he moves
through the preface creating a bond between the narrator
and reader against the Nonconformist.
Most of Arnold's criticism of the Nonconformist is
effected through irony. Arnold seems merely to be
interested in improving the Nonconformist, not critici2ing
him:
So while we praise and esteem the zeal of the
Nonconformists in working staunchly by the best
light they have, and desire to take no t;hit from
it, we seek to add to this what we call
SW( etness and light, and to develop their full
humanity more perfectly. To seek this is
certainly not to be the enemy of the
Nonconformist. (11)
At this point Arnold '5 persona seems sincere and
convincing to other established churchmen. They would
perhaps all agree that their intention was merely to
enlighten the poor, naivL Nonconformist. Arnold develops
a narrator-persona who bonds himself to the established
churchmen through his ability to assume their attitude. He
moves between the "enlightened" liberal phrasing, above,
and the blunt phrasing of the middle class, below, to bind
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his audience together and to him. When he "got tough"
with the Nonconformists he said: "The Nonconformist has
worshipped his fetish of separatistl!. so long that he is
likely to wish still to remain, liks: Ephraim, 'a wild ass
alone by himself. '" As Arnold uses the Nonconformist as
the "common enemy," he also works him into a character
that plays the role of the "fanatic ll who is blind to the
light of "perfection."
His in-group, out-group polarization is al~o
effective when he chooses single individuals as
representatives of an idea or belief he particularly
despises. As a schools inspector Arnold knew very well
the ways unscrupulous men and women profited from the
system of education. He attacks one of the practices of a
specific boarding-house operator who crams as many
children as possible into his school, then makes them all
buy the same book (one he happens to have PUbliShed),
thereby profiting not only from calling his boarding-house
a school and receiving government money for that, but also
from the sale of his book. This man, who is well known in
government circles because he is also the editor of the
Quarterly ReView, is for Arnold a good "representative" of
what he calls the "machinery" of society.
Dr. William smith, the learned and distinguished
editor of the Quarterly Review, is, as we all
know, the compiler of school-bJoks meritorious
and many . . . for has not Mr. Oscar Browning.
managed to fire Or. William Smith (himself, no
doubt, the modestest man alive, and never
3'
trained at Eton) with the same spirit, and made
him insert in his own~ a puff, so to
speak, of his own school-books, declaring that
they are (as they are) meritorious and reany? (9)
Even though the reader is urged to look up"ln Dr. smith as
slightly villainous, Arnold maintains the reader as his
"confederate," while simultaneously maintaining the
admiration of Dr. William smith himself:
Dr. William Smith, of the Quarterly Reyiew, came
up to me a day or two ago with his hand held
out, saying he forgave me all I had said about
him and the~, Which, he added, was a
great deal, for the sake of the truth <lnd
usefulness of what I had said about the
Nonconformists. (Letters, 2: 3)
The effectiveness of Arnold's use of in-group, out-group
polarization is evident in his victim's Willingness to
"forgive" a direct, personal attack because he too feels
he 1s a part of the in-group, as reader/protagonist. The
victim of the direct criticism is willing to put aside his
own discomfort for the sake of the in-group: the
established churchmen.
Arnold I S preface weaves threads made from anecdote
and criticism to bind the reader to the narrator. His
"insignificant point of departure" is Bishop Wilson who,
at first, is merely someone who reminds the reader of his
safe and secure past. He represents "our childhood," and
within the safety of that childhood are the Bishop's
~ of the established church. with Bishop Wilson,
Arnold appeals to the reader's nostalgia and values. He
then anchors that courtship by creating an out-group which
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can safely be ridiculed. The Nonconfo""lllts become a
useful couon enemy by means of which Arnold can further
befriend the reader. Once the reader is in an accepting
tra.e of lIind, Arnold is in a position to widen his
criticism, at times pointing it back at the reader,
without serious risk of losing the reader's alll'9iance.
Throughout the text of CUlture and Anarchy Arnold
maintains the relationship wit... the reader that he has so
carefully nurtured in the preface. As he becollles more
direct in his criticism of different groups and people
within British society, the strain on the relationship
increases, causing him to use different strategies. In
order to show the difficUlty of maintaining a relationship
with the reader, I will look at his chapter "Barbarians,
Philistines, PopUlace- where he directly addresses the
foibles and shortcomings that exist within each social
class. To maintain the rel..ltionship with the reader, he
uses a strategy, common to the Bildungsroman, of placing
his narrator in a vulnerable position. At the beginning of
the chapter Arnold introduces a topic, then accepts fault
himself for his own limited perspective on the topic: "I
have omitted, I find, to complete the old-fashioned
analysis which I had the fancy of applying, ..• " and "I
will venture to humbly offer myself as an illustration of
defect . . ." (99). As narrator he reveals to the reader
that he is equal to the reader, and as Gates says: "{h)e
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condescends to his readers with a gracious elaborateness"
in order to make them "feel they are his equals" (124). He
explains to his readers that he too has made mistakes,
thereby showing that he is willing to acknowledge his own
fault while encouraging the reader to do the same. Though
he finds Ifthese confessions ... bitter and unpleasant"
(100), he nevertheless also finds them convenient to use
as a "point of departure" for discussing the faults of
others. He then passes from him,celf to the working-class
with one of his rare sharp satires:
Perhaps Canning'S "Needy Knife-Grinder" ' ....ho is
dead, and t.herefore cannot be pained at my
taking him for an illustration) may serve to
give us the noti:>n of defect in the esser.~ial
quality of a working class; or I might even cite
(since, though he is alive in the flesh, he is
dead to all heed of criticism) my poor old
poaching friend, zephaniah Diggs, who, between
his hare-snaring and his gin-drinking, has got
his powers of sYlnpathy quite dulled and his
powers of action in any great movement of his
class hopelessly impaired. (100)
Throughout the chapter, Arnold tempers direct criticism,
such as that of "Needy Knife-Grinder" by returning to his
own faults, and the faults of the Nonconformists. He
maintains that he is a member of a group just like
everyone else, then creates another group outside the ones
he criticizes, for h:...~self and his readers to find refuge
in. This group he calls the "aliens" because they do not
fit the stereotypes of the other groups, and he makes it
clear that this gr, ..Ip has fewer faults to mend:
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· • . [Wlhen we speak of ourselves as divided
into Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace, we
must be understood always to imply that within
each of these classes there are a certain number
of ili.!m§ •• persons who are mainly led, not
by their class spirit, but by a general humane
spirit. (109)
Through having a "humane" spirit, the reader happily
escapes the mechanistically motivated "Barbarians,
Philistines, and Populace." Arnold then begins to shape
the chapter as a conversation so that the reader can
b.dieve he/she is, like Arnold, a "humane spirit." When
he says: "But I remember once cenversing with a company of
Nonconformist admirers of some lecturer ... " (111), he
embraces the reader with a jovial and informal story of
the kind t he reader would encounter in a social setting.
The Nonconformist is not satirized; satire would not serve
Arnold's purpose because it would be too easy. Arnold's
readeL'S are accustomed to reading satiric vignettes about
the Nonconformists; they are not, however, accustomed to
having the Nonconformists discussed as well-meaning but
errant children. Arnold hopes that the reader is
interested in his confidential anecdotes, and is eagerly
awaiting the next one, rather than taking umbrage at his
assessment of the reader himself, or the group to which
slhe belongs.
Teward the end of the chapter Arnold continues to
hold the reader close to him through his use of "we. II
Each time he makes a point that he hopes will have a
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profound effect on the reader, he "speaks" as though "we"
were all in agreement already. For instance, at the end of
IIBarbarian" he uses "we" to bring "us" all to a common
recognition of what "we" believe before "go(ing] a little
deeper" :
We see, then, how indispensable to that human
perfection which we seek is, in thE! opinion of
good. jUdges, some pUblic recognition and
establishment of our best self, or right reason
•.. But now let us try to go a little deeper,
and to find, beneath our actual habits and
practice, the very ground and cause out of Which
they spring. (128)
Arnold's conciliatory concluding paragraph to this
Chapter, which criticizes England's "three great classes,"
exemplifies not only Arnold's careful "courtship" of the
reader, but also the purpose for which the "courtship" is
effected--to encourage a re-education of the reader, to
find "beneath our actual habits" what forces create those
habits.
As Arnold moves through the chapter gathering up the
reader and moving him/her along the ever more confusing
road to "perfection," his involvement with the reader as a
co-conspirator, friend, and confederate is easy to
identify. Arnold understands that when he speaks he does
not dare alienate. He is speaking to people who would
respond; and, because their response is important to him,
he respects their sense of who they are, and their
acquired beliefs. For this reason, Arnold uses what
Kenneth Burke has labelled a "courtship" relationship
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with the audience. He is ever near to the
reader/protagonist who is courted by the text and so may
be trans formed by it.
Through Arnold' s intricately structured text he is
able to draw on a wide range of human emotions. It is not
simply that the reader laughs alonl] with Arnold at others,
or that through Arnold's criticisms the reader receives
wisdom. Tl:e narrator and reader share a relationship that
includes laughter and criticism. The relationship changes
and grows just as the text does.
As I have shown, frolll the preface, the groundwork is
laid for this relationship. Arnold begins by Ciiscussing
the "Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge" and
through this discussion is quickly brought into the text
as Arnold recalls memories of "our childhood." with this
disarming preface the reader has lost his/her supposed
function as reader-critic and becomes reader-protagonist.
Arnold absorbs the reader in a "courtship," and the
reader'S response is a series rf negotiations with
Arnold's method. The narrator's words provoke response,
or "mental" actions. in the reader:
Actions [have] to be seen as the progressive
dialectical unfolding of something, ill.§t, so
that the knower and known might share a common
ground of identity. (Altieri 239)
By building a common ground from bits of shared background
and a common desire, Arnold hopes to create a more
civilized and intelligent society, that springs from a
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new-found geist within his reader. The geist he believes
he can reach is the intertwined tradition and experience
of the British people who, he feels, are held back from
geist because they are inculcated with a narrow,
Hebraistic dogma.
Arnold's interest, in Culture and Anarchy, is that
his style create a dialectic that c",:, "transform" the
reader's ideas. What they might be transformed into,
however, Arnold cannot control. Kenneth Allott says that
Arnold's "disinterested" stance allows him to have success
with what truly is of interest to him:
If a "strategy of disinterestedness" exists in
Arnold's wish to speak calmly and without
rancour, the wish is in no sense Jesuitical: it
stands both for the respect with which the
writer approaches the truth and for tile power of
his writings to charm an audience. (27)
Although for Arnold there is a trutll as he believes it to
be, he also knows that he cannot guarantee that a reader
will arrive at that same truth. He does believe that his
approach will enable the reader to use "right reason," and
through it will ultimately arrive at trutll.
Throughout the dialectical "courtship, n and the other
relationships explored in this chapter, Arnold uses his
rhetorical skill to perform the difficult task of engaging
the reader, and holding his/her allegiance, while subtly
questioning many of the reader I s values.
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CHAPl'ER 4
STRATEGIES AND SOCRATES
In chapter three t explored Arnold's development of a
close relationship with his reader. His criticism of
political groups and people is at timQs so pointed that
the relationship he develops in his preface, and maintains
throughout, is necessary to keep the reader friendly
toward the writer's views. It is his method. for saying
what he has to say without alienating his reader. The
rhetorical strategies that Arnold uses are what Burke
calls a "courtship." T~;<; strateqy, along with Arnold's
.anipulation of the narrator's role someti.es as a
commentator. and sOlletimes as an actor who simUltaneously
comments on his faults, is meant to keep the reader alert
to the text and the play of ideas Arnold is encouraging.
The seeming lack of structure encourages the reader to
make decisions about issues basod on his/her own thinking,
rather than decisions based on others' thinking.
In chapter four I will explore the methods Arnold
uses to encourage independent thought. One of those
methods is SocratGS' maxim "Know thyself," which he uses
as a significant point of departure in t:....o ways: first, he
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uses the maxim as both a guide and warning to the reader,
and second, he emphasizes both "knowing" and "thyself."
As a ttguide" the maxim can be seen as a rellllr.der to the
Tp.dder that, above all else, one must first "know" for
oneself before one should heed the knowledge of others.
The maxim implies that all external "fact" is useful only
after one's self-knowledge is established. As a warning,
"Know thyself" implies that, if one does not seek self-
cultivation--or scl.E-knowledge--one will easily be led
astray by others. Although "Know thyself" is referred to
explicitly only in Culture and Anarchy's introduction,
nonetheless it is a significant maxim within the text.
Arnold attempts to guide his reader to know for
him/herself whether some issue, or prejudice, is "true."
He calls attention to his reader's prejudices, which he
believes are the cause of the social and religious
tensions within society, to show his readers that the
prejudice caused by blindly following the leadership of
others diminishes "truth." As a warning, ItKnow thyself"
reminds his readers that they will be harmed by following
those who personally gain from exploiting the existing
differences between people. To help his readers recognize
when others are manipulating the pUblic's prejUdice,
Arnold attempts to show how prejudice and mis-apprehension
of basic information can be manipulated for the purpose of
being divisive. If Arnold is successful, the reader's
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reconsideration of his/her own bias brings the reader to a
new knowledge of him/herself. "Know thyself" is his
central purpose because it directs the reader to follow
only his/her c.,,'n knowledge, and to know from ....ithin
oneself the basis for that knowledge.
The admonition to "Know thyself," then, is the
"little deeper" Arnold means his reader to go "beneath
[his/her] actuc.:i. habits and practice': (128). As he exposes
layers of prejudice and belief for examination he causes
the reader to participate in judging, reflecting, and
coming to know. As the reader struggles with Arnold's
review of past political and religious actions, s/he is
also struggling to recreate a personal "truth." A
dialectical tension results from the pUll of opposing
beliefs, and the reader must renegotiate the "truth" of
the beliefs in order to ease the tension.
We can explore this strategy of Arnold's in his
intrOduction when he uses the words of John Bright, an
elected politician, and Frederic Harrison, a frequent
contributor to the periodic press, to evoke the popUlar
understandi.ng of culture, and then challenges that
understanding. In the introduction Arnold uses two
familiar characters to create the tension between his
evolving concept of culture and what the public believes
culture to be. He calls Bright "that fine speaker and
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famous Liberal" but depicts Bright as being neither "fine"
nor "bright" in his thoughts and words:
In one of his speeches a short time ago, that
fine speaker and famous Liberal, Mr. Bright,
took occasion to have a fling at the friends and
preachers of culture. "People who talk about
what they call ~!" said he contemptuously;
"by which they mean a smattering of the two dead
languages of Greek and Latin. tl And he went on to
remark, in a strain with which modern speakers
and writers have made us very familiar, how poor
a thing this culture is, how little good it can
do to the world, and how absurd it is for its
possessors to set much store by it. And the
other day a younger Liberal than Mr. Bright, one
of a school whose mission it i~ to bring into
order and system that body of truth with which
the earlier Liberals merely fumbled, a member of
the University of OXford, and a very clever
writer, Mr. Frederic Harrison, developed, ...
the thesis which Mr. Bright had propounded in
only general terms. (39)
As well as calling Bright's wisdom and his notion of
culture into question, Arnold shows that Harrison is a
disciple of Bright' $. The two are brought together in
this way in much of the text, until it becomes nearly
automatic to think of them as one.
Later in his introduction, Arnold tells the reader he
does not mean culture to be confused with power. To Bright
and Harrison power and culture mean the same thing and
"those popular Liberals" who speak against culture have
convinced the public that what Arnold means by culture is
the careful control of public freedom and power by
academic scholars, the ones who know a "smattering of
Greek and Latin." Arnold seeks to change this
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concept of culture first by stating his own position
within the introduction:
Now for my part I do not wish to see lien of
culture asking to be entrusted with power; and,
indeed, I have freely said, that in my opinion
the speech most proper, at present, tor a man ot
culture to make to a body of his fellow-
countrymen who get hi. into a cOlDllittee-rooll, is
Socrates's: Know Thyself! and this is not a
~!,eech to be made by men wanting to be entrusted
witn power. (401
He sets Bright and Harrison, the "fellow-countrymen who
[woUld want to) get him into a committee-root:l," against
Socrates, in a sellse pitting the Hebraists (Bright and
Harrison) against the Hellenist. As is typical of Arnold,
he tells the reader nothing specific in this except "Know
thyself." His goal with Bright and Harrison seems to be
to show their lack of logic, while reminding his reader
that what is important is to 1m2X for oneself. Arnold uses
the words of Bright and Harrison throughout CUlture llnd
~ as I will shoW in my next chapter when I explore
Arnold's use of representative cha.racters.
His use of Socrates' maxim "Know thyself- is subtly
implied throughout the text. He situates tho maxim within
a dialectical context in his chapter "HebraiSm and
Hellenism," which reflects many of the most prominent
political and religious prejudices of his day. In this
chapter he raises delicate and charged issues and opens
them for re-examination with what Buckler calls his
"marvellous nimbleness." He feels this Chapter is
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important because he believes its sUbject matter is "so
true t •. 'lt ... [it) will form a kind of centre for English
thought and speculation ..." (~ 2:11). He begins
the chapter by going "back for a moment to Bishop wilson"
(129). This circling back is his rhetorical touchstone.
It is a chance for the reader to revie.... and revise
assumptions formed in an effort to "know" him/herself.
Arnold invites the reader to share this process of
revision as he states: "we find ourselves opening up a
number of large questions on every side" (129). He then
enters into a discussion of the accepted beliefs about and
attitudes toward Hebraism and Hellenism in order to cause
new speCUlation, to assist lithe individual to an
intellectual delivery [by) sever[ing] the umbilical cord
of SUbstantiality" (Kierkegaard 215). In other words, in
order to re-create "truth," Arnold attempts to cut the
reader away from what slhe accepts unquestioningly as
"truth. It He achieves this by bringing into confrontation
the underlying belief systems of both Hebraism and
Hellenism:
The final aim of both Hellenism and Hebraism, as
of all great spiritual disciplines, is no doubt
the same: man's perfection or salvation. The
very language which they both of them use in
schooling us to reach this aim is often
identical. (130)
The reader is justified it slhe is surprised by Arnold's
treatment of the two belief systeIl's. The equality he
affords to Hebraism and Hellenism is a departure from what
S2
the nineteenth-century public commonly believes to be his
position.
As Arnold begins his discussion of Hebraism and
Hellenism, he firsts reminds his reader of Bishop wilson.
Arnold then presents his view that although as a nation
"we" have "energy and persistence in walking according to
the best light we have" (129), we are often "not careful
enough ... to see that our light be not darkness" (129).
As the chapter develops, Arnold works at this notion until
he has nearly stated that ...·nat he means is that the
"Light" of Hebraism is in fact "Darkness."
At the beginning of the chapter, however, he is never
so explicit about his views, and first leads the reader to
believe that the apparent difference between Hebraism and
Hellenism is, in fact, merely the manufacture of man: "And
these two forces we may regard as in some sense rivals,
--rivals no-.: by the necessity of their own nature, but as
exhibited in man and his history" (129). He continues to
argue that the two forces are really two versions of the
same force by placing the two side-by-side and stating
that the driving force behind each is knowledge, in a
Socratic sense. Arnold's argument cannot however be
dismissed as purely manipulation in order to convince the
reader of his own view; in fact he does not offer a view.
Instead, he offers a different perspective and cautions
the reader to "Know thyself" in a way that is typical of
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the Bildungsroman. He does this first by cautioning his
reader to be aware of others' arguments:
When the two [Hebraism and Hellenism) are
confronted, as they very often are confronted,
it is nearly always with what I may call a
rhetorical purpose; the speaker I s whole design
is to exalt and enthrone one of the two, and he
uses the other only as a foil and to enable him
the better to give effe.ct to his purpose. (130)
He folloWs this with an ironic aside that brings the
reader back into his circle with his use of "us":
"Obviously, with us, it is usually Hellenism which is thus
reduced to minister to the triumph of Hebraism" (130). He
wants him/her to know that the popular attitude toward
Hellenism is rhetorically manipulated. He reminds his
reader of the "rhetorical purpose" within speech and
writing, hoping to stimulate him/her to question whether
his/her attitude toward HQllenism has been manipulated.
Arnold's method is found within Kierkegaard's concept of a
writer's ability to change what everyone believes is true
(Kierkegaard 237). Kierkegaard's term for what society
makes into fact is the "actuality." He says that what the
ironist attempts to do through irony is "negate" the
I'actuality," or call into question what people have come
to assume are facts. Arnold' s calling socially created
assumptions into question and his encouragment of self-
discovered assumptions is his attempt to change the
actuality. Arnold hopes the nlilW actuality will repr":l;sent a
balance between Hebraism and Hellenism.
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The balance that Arnold believes should exist between
Hebraism and Hellenism is the "harmonious" part of the
"perfection" that he thinks culture exemplifies. The two
impulses, one toward Hebraism, the other toward Hellenism,
diverge because of perceptions and movements within
society:
Language may be abundantly quoted froll both
Hellenism and Hebraism to make it seem the one
follows the same current as the other towards
the same goal. They are, truly, borne towards
the same goal; but the currents which bear them
are infinitely different. (133)
These "currents" are whatever Arnold's reader decides to
make them. Arnold is never explicit but leaves open the
way to one I s own understanding.
Even though Arnold may have strong preferences for
Hellenism, his emphasis remains on the similarities
between Hellenism and Hebraism, not the differences, and
this encourages the reader to reassess his/her beliefs. It
is Arnold's seemingly disinterested, dispassionate
"discussion" that allows the reader an opportunity for
that reassessment of an assumed "actuality." Arnold's
stance does not force the reader to defend his/her former
notions about Hellenism, and his confidential tone treats
the reader as a "confederate," whethor the reader is
predisposed to agree with Arnold or not. This situation
obtains at least until Arnold works his way through his
history lesson to the Fall of Hellenism:
ss
Apparently it was the Hellenic conception of
human nature which was unsound, for the world
could not live by .it. Absolutely to call it
unsound, however, 1.S to fall into the common
error of its Hebraising enemies; but it was
unsound at that particular moment of man I s
development, it was premature. (136)
Here again he raises two thoughts for the reader: the one
that the rivalry between Hebraism and Hellenism is a
manufacture of man, and the other, only barely hinted at,
that Hellenism is the sounder of the two. The reader is
urged to think about the "Habraising enemies" and the
lifeneral pUblic's conception of the godlessness of
Hellenism. In order for Arnold to stimulate the reader's
desire to question his/her long held beliefs about the
non-Christian ideology represented by Hellenism, he knows
he must tread rhetorically. The balance between Hebraism
and Hellenism now becomes something more abstract. Arnold
knows his reader is prejudiced in favour of Hebraism, just
as Arnold himself is prejudiced in favour of Hellenism.
The struggle for a balanced view of the two resides in the
struqgle of ideas between the narrator and reader. In
other words, the balance, if one occurs, occurs outside
the text, where Arnold's particular presentation of ideas
dislodges some of the reader's prejUdice, urging him/her
one way, while s/he resists the new ideas and pulls back
toward his/her original position.
After Arnold records the Fall of Hellenism in his
history lesson, he then interrupts his more distanced tone
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and replaces it briefly with a dramatically oratorical
tone, one reminiscent of a minister's exhortation:
To a world stricken with moral enervation
Christianity offered its spectacle of an
inspired self-sacrifice; to men who refused
themselves nothing, it showed one who refused
himself everything, --"my saviour banished joy!"
says George Herbert. When the~, the
life-giving and joy-giving power of nature, so
fondly cherished by the pagan world, could not
save her followers from self-dissatisfaction and
ennui, the severe words of the apostle came
bracingly and refreshingly: "Let no man deceive
you with vain words, for because of these
things, ....meth the wrath of God upon the
children of disobedience." (137)
"Let no man deceive you with vain words," is Arnold's
Hebraistic way of reminding his reader to "Know thyself, 11
Hellenistically. The oratorical quality of Herbert's
emphasized cry, as well as the apostle's warning, raises
this passage of Arnold's from its usually engaging but
witty form to one that is far more dramatic. Arnold
illlplies it is a weak moment in the world that allows
Christianity to sneak in, and dazzle man with its
"spectacle of ... inspired self-sacrifice." His word
choice belies any true faith in Hebraism the reader might
attribute to him. As well he says that through its embrace
of Christianity, the world learns fear and obedience. It
is the obedience that Hebraism demands which Arnold feels
keeps the world in the dark and on its knees. Obedience,
in Arnold's view, requires a mindless adherence to rules,
and it is to this that he so strongly objects: " ... of
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the two disciplines laying their main stress (Hebraism and
Hellenism], the one, on clear intelligence, the other, on
firm obedience" (1]7). It is in statements such as this
that Arnold's preservation of a balance between Hebraism
and Hellenism wavers because he maintains that Hellenism's
stress is on "clear intelligence, It a superior function in
Arnold I S way of thinking to Hebraism's IIfirm obedience."
Arnold's apparent recognition that he has possibly
sprung the dialectical tension through his exhortation
makes him once again change tone and rhythm, back to the
more distanced, academic language that he had used earlier
in the chapter:
Hebraism and Hellenism are, neither of them, the
.l.mi of human development, as their admirers are
prone to make them; they are, each of them,
cQntributiQns to hUman deveIQpment,--august
contributions, invaluable cQntributJ.ons; and
each showing itself tQ us more august, more
invi:.1uable, mQre preponderant Qver the other,
according to the moment in which we take them,
and the relation in which we stand to them.
(138)
Through his balancing of these two great for("f"'s as equal
contributions to mankind, he attacks the notion that any
type Qf Qbedience, Qr any vengefulness tQward another
because Qf his/her Qbedience is unnecessary to the
furthering of "human development." He again urges his
reader to balance the two contrary forces of Hebraism and
HelleniSm in order to come to "know" where s/he is. He
manages to open an emotional SUbject, that of one's belief
and religious preference, while aVQiding a confrontation
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with the reader and, Ultimately, avoiding the reader's
rejection ot the 9rocess of coming to "Know
[him/her} self."
Though at the beginning of the chapter Arnold is
talking about historical classicism, he uses Bishop Wilson
to introduce that SUbject, making the bishop his
"speCUlative starting-point." He quotes Bishop Wilson's
words: It'First, never go against the best light you have;
secondly, take care that your light be not darkness' n
(129). Thus he reminds his reader to beware of the source
of his/her own "light" when considering the value of both
Hebraism and Hellenism. with Bishop Wilson's caution in
the reader's mind, he then asks his reader to reconsider
"culture" and "Hellenism" through his/her own "best light"
to find a way to the "truth." He wants his reader to
consider carefully whether s/he has, in fact, used his/her
own "best light," or whether their "light" is in truth
"darkness." Throughout his discussion Arnold manipulates
the reader's beliefs about and impressions of Hebraism and
Hellenism to confuse the reader and, through this process,
immerse the reader in the dialectic. The truth is no
1I.,nger within easy reach. Arnold hopes this Socratic
technique will be an aid to the "process of transformation
whereby the [reader's] position at the end transce.lds his
position at the start, 50 that the position at the start
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can eventually bl;! seen in terms of the new motivation
encountered en route" (Burke, ~,422).
Toward the end of this chapter, Arnold, in his
"courtship" style, again includes the reader as a partner
in what "we" know. Arnold involves the reader in an
examination of the "single great idea" of "immortality."
His open criticism of St. Paul, for example, illustrates
his confidence at this point in the text in questioning
Hebraistic notions:
Perhaps we may help ourselves to see this
clearer by an illustration drawn frol'll the
treatment of a single great idea which has
profoundly engaged the human spirit, and has
given it eminent opportunities for showing its
nobleness and energy. It surely must be
perceived that the idea of immortality, as this
idea rises in its generality before the human
spirit, is something grander, truer, and more
satisfying than it is in the particular forms by
which St. Paul ... endeavour(s] to develop and
establish it. surely we cannot but feel that
the argumentation with which the Hebrew apostle
goes about to expound this great idea is, after
all, confused and inconclusive. (139)
Arnold believes that his reader, who is part of the "we,"
would agree that St. Paul is "confused and inconclusive"
since the reader now understands that there is some reason
to question what "we" once simply followed. He encourages
an intellectual growth in his reader that might assist the
reader to differentiate fact from popUlar notions. He
works to help his reader know that the confusion of the
Industrial Age and all of its attendant change would not
be halted, reversed, or cured by llblind obedience" to
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Hebraism. He reminds his readers that to gain the control
and reason that the Age requires can occur only if "well
see the interconnection of history, religion, and
intellect:
In all directions our habitual courses of action
seem to be losing efficaciousness, credit, and
control, both with others and even with
ourselves; everywhere we see the beginnings of
confusion, and we want a clue to some sound
order and authority. This we can only get by
going back upon the actual instincts and forces
Which rule our life, seeing th8lD as they really
are, connecting them with other instincts and
forces, and enlarging our Whole view and rule of
life. (144)
Arnold's comment on the senselessness of obedience is,
rhetorically, a most fitting way to end his dialectically
Challenging chapter "Hebraism and Hellenism." His
presentation does not attack or victimize the reade):;
therefore, the reader is not forced into a defensive
stance. He ably provides alternatives to Hebraism,
without "raising his voice." His method, one which he
defends as the only one he feels will "work," is rich in
its sense of the reader and its efforts to include the
reader so that s/he will come to "Know" him/herself.
Arnold uses a similar path of dialectical tension to
establish the potential for the reader I s re-vision of
his/her concept of "culture." In culture and Anarchy the
two opposing realities, "culture" and/or "anarchy," do not
meet toe-to-toe. Instead, they confront each other
through two of Arnold's other familiar terms, Il perfection"
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and "machinery," both found within the chapter Arnold
entitled "Sweetness and Light." For Arnold, "perfection
... moves by the force, not merely or primarily of the
scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the
moral and social passion for doing good" (45). By having
introduced "perfection" as the essence of "culture,"
Arnold turns again to Bishop Wilson to unite "culture" to
the dominant Hebraistic values in society. Arnold tells
his reader that Bishop Wilson could supply the motto for
"culture, II or "perfection," with his words "To make reason
and the will of God prevail!" (45) He does not say that
Bishop Wilson says "this is what culture does"; rather, he
implies the Bishop would agree that "culture" does combine
"reason and the will of God," thus uniting Hebraism and
Hellenism once again. Arnold himself continues in this
vein stating that "culture ... demands worthy notions of
reason and the will of God" (45). With Bishop Wilson's
"blessing, It then, Arnold unites Hebraism and Hellenism
under the yoke of culture.
As Arnold reiterates his thesis that culture is
something larger than the academic love for books and an
aristocratic assumption of one's importance that Mr.
Bright and Mr. Harrison lead everyone to believe it is, he
continues with his discussion of culture's dialectical
opposite, which is anarchy. The discussion of anarchy
occurs solely in the chapter Arnold entitled "Sweetness
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and Light." He tells his reader that since "we" all know
"that culture, instea~ of being ... frivolous and
useless . . . has a very important function to fulfil
... " (48), "we" can turn our attention to culture's
antithesis: "anarchy." Arnold uses the term "machinery"
to create a more tangible, physical reality for the
abstract term "anarchy." He says that "machinery, 11
because it has no soul or spiritual centre, led society
astray. He raises his argument by listing most of the
possessions and attitudes held dear by the majority of
nineteenth-century individuals:
What is freedom but machinery? what is
population but machinery? what is coal but
machiner.y? what are railroads but machinel":'?
... what are, even, religious organisations
but machinery? (50)
The list, in litany style, brings before people's eyes the
tools of a spiritually lost society. Arnold cautions that
when "things" became goals or ends in and of themselves,
society loses its purpose. He believes that the
glorification of coal, for instance, leads to anarchy
because:
Our coal, thousands of people were saying, is
the real basis of our national greatness; if our
coal runs short, there is an end of the
greatness of England. But what is greatness?
--culture makes us ask. Greatness is a spiritual
condition worthy to excite love, interest, and
admiration. (51)
Arnold reminds his readers that England was great before
coal, and that having coal has not created greatness.
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Greatness, he contends, is a "harmonious perfection,"
which he equates with culture. "The idea ot perfection as
an inward condition of the mind and spirit is at variance
with the mechanical and material civilisation in esteem
with us" (49). His casting of "machinery" in a perhaps
anarchical role of loOvil confuses his Victorian readers,
who are, for the most part, enamoured of the Industrial
Age. His readers I confusion flows from the love they have
come to have for things mechanical. He attempts to show
that the love of "machinery" is creating a world in which
"having something It supersedes any "inward conditions of
the mind and spirit" (48). To Arnold, this almost
inevitably leads to anarchy because society has lost its
spiritual standard. He wants his readers to re-appraise
the importance of having wealth, coal, and machinery as
goals in and of themselves. In this sense, culture and
anarchy becomes society's either/or struggle, as England
moves inexorably toward its future.
In S'ome senses, Arnold' 5 appeal through these pages
in "Sweetness and Light" is directly oratorical. He
exhorts the reader to move toward an appreciation of the
"inward condition" of "perfection" that is culture. His
choice of "perfection" as the defining term for culture,
is a dialectical one, however, which urges the reader to
reconsider culture as something other than an inherent
predisposition of the aristocracy. Before he begins the
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discussion of dQfinitions for culture and machinery, he
opens his chapter with the VQry problem of connotation.
He uses the word' .::uriosity" as his example: "The
disparagers of culture make its motive curiositytl (43). He
launches into a discussion of the problem the English have
with "curiosity" because thC'!y view the term "always .
in a somewhat disapproving sense." He feels the word
lIconveys a certain notion of frivolous and unedifying
activity. II Arnold discusses the English notion of the
word "curiosity" at great length, and chides the English
for being unable to see the two senses of the word, one
good and one bad, that Europeans do. When Arnold uses the
word "curiosity," he emphasizes the benefit of having a
questioning attitude:
For as there is a curiosity abou\; intellectual
matters which is futile, and merely a disease,
so there is certainly a curiosity,--a desire
after the things of the mind simply fa ...· their
own sakes and for the pleasure of seeing them as
they are, --which is, in an i .elligent being,
natural and laudable. (44)
His explanation that there is pleasure in intellectual
discovery reinforces his argument for the importance of
allOWing at least "two senses" to exist in the definition
of "culture. n He says "But there is of culture another
view," and hopes the reader resists the single-sighted
English habit of eliminating all but the one, prevalent
view of culture as a synonym of "selfish ease." He
encourages the reader to allow for other definitions that
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give to culture a wider meaning, which includes
intellectual development. In these ways, Arnold works to
keep the dialectical tension of his text continually
challenging to the reader in order to keep the reader
moving toward a "tratlsformation· to "know" hia/herself.
The "delicate" and .. tentative" qualities that william
Buckler saw in 5=ulture and Anarchy are evident in Arnold's
use of terms such as, "perfection," "sweetness," or
"CUlture," whiCh Arnold purposely leaves undefined because
he wants to preserve their flexible connotations, just as
he strives to pr",serve a flexible connotation for the word
"curiosity." Once the reader absorbs a sense of Arnold's
mUltiple connotations of the word "perfection," or the
converging elements within the terms "Hebraism" and
"Hell.enism," slhe is really left to create a personal
definition. Arnold's desire for his ideas to be debated
leads him to write a text that is more than his platform
for reform, or even a severe criticism of his society.
Instead, it is a text that causes the reader to question.
It is also one that is tentative in its recreation of
civilized interaction, making its presentational method in
man}' ways similar to Goethe's Bildungsroman. Arnold's
desire to write about pOlitics, education, and religion in
a manner that is " r eceivable" leads him to use his
poetic creativity to write "delicate, tentative, and
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fluid" prose, making it more nearly literature than
polellic.
When Arnold uses rhetorical devices such as those :I
have exallined in this chapter, he is creating a dialectic:
a discussion between opposing views. Arnold's knowledge
of Goethe's style and philosophy affects his own writing
so that we are able to observe his rhetorical strategies
and explore his method of creating this dialectic. He uses
Socrates' maxim "KnoW' thyself" to encourage the reader to
come to his/her o\ol'n conclusions about social and political
issues. Within his creation of a dialectical text, his
use of irony as the placing of any idea in opposition to
itself gives his readers an opportunity to reconsider
"truth" without being told the path to follow in their
reconsideration. When Arnold places ideas such as Hebraislll
and Hellenism in opposition to each other, then conflates
them, he is imagining a "common ground where (these) two
ideas might do battle" (Burke, ~, 33), leaving the
reader to decide who and wh<l.t has won. Becaul'lo;' of his
complex dialectic, Arnold is able to "avoid merely
substituting one routine, unimaginative way of seeing
one's life ... for another ... " (Buckler 75).
Whether Arnold is conflating "Hebraism and
Hellenism" or mapping the distinction between perfection
and machinery, he is always comparing, or offering, two
opposites for consideration. He asks the reader to
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indicate where the line of "truth" falls between thell. In
this way, he involves the reader in the formation of
his/her own understanding, and encourages the reader to
"Know thyself," through the Eethod of the dialectic.
In this chapter, I have chosen the greatest
ideological differences, those of "Hebraisll and Hellenism"
and "culture and anarchy," to explore Arnold's rhetorical
use of Socrates' maxim "Know thyself." A.rnold uses the
maxim to compel the reader to reconsider his/her own
"truth" located between opposing forces.
6.
CHAPTER 5
REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTERS
In chapter four I explored Arnold's rhetorical use of
Socrates' maxim "Know thyself" as a dialectical tool in
his chapter "Hebraism and Hellenism," and in his general
development of a context for his terms "culture" and
"anarchy." His rhetorical strategy in these instances, as
in his courtship, is to involve the reader and engage
him/her in a self-formative process, a process similar to
that of Goethe's Bildungsroman.
In this chapter, I will explore another strategy
often found within the Bildungsroman, the development of
what Susan Wells calls a "representative character." In
chapter four, I discussed John Bright and Frederic
Harrison's role in the introduction to culture and Anarchy
as Arnold's attempt to bring the reader to a position of
reconsideration of these men's ideas. In this chapter I
will focUs on their usefulness as "representative
characters" within the dialectic. I will also explore
Arnold's use of representative groups and terms.
Representative characters are for the most part used
examples of a group's or society's thinking or
.,
behaviour. Arnold uses representative characters to bring
together typical ideas and behaviours in order to
encourage intellectual reflection. I have shown in an
earlier chapter his ability to form alliances across
groups with his "in-group/out-group" technique. I have
also shown his ability to stereotype behaviours with
characters such as "Needy Knife-Grinder." In addition to
his use of representation in these areas, he is also able
to create characters or characteristic groups, whose ideas
and behaviours seem truly, believably "typical" (Wells)
rather than "flat" reductions of what they represent,
through combining what they have written themselves in
articles or letters with his descriptive preambles to
their words.
Arnold uses the names and words of politicians and
clerics in culture and Anarchy, but creates roles for them
to play by choosing from what they have written or
pUblicly stated. He then re-presents them through their
words, but in an order and form that are unfamiliar to the
pUblic. The effect is that nineteenth-century readers
recognized the familiar political and religious
representatives Arnold uses, but often did not identify
with what these representatives said--at least not in the
way their statements appear in culture and Anarchy.
Through these representations, Arnold causes the reader to
have misgivings about these "important" individuals,
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thereby causing some tension between his/her previous
approval of the figure, and the new doubts created from
reading Culture and Anarchy. This manipulation of the
dialectical tension helps to keep the reader involved, and
thinking. as s/he processes the information in the text.
Arnold is not always satirical with his
representation. He does not always intend to victimize
the figure. He works, as will be seen, to encourage in
the reader a curiosity about these political men that
would develop into a reconsideration of the reader's
mechanistic faith in them as political or spiritual
leaders. The representation of his contemporaries, John
Bright, a popUlar Liberal politician, and Frederic
Harrison, an essayist and philosopher, for instance, is
flexible in the sense that Arnold seems to have some
admiration for the men at the same time that he seems to
be criticizing them. Kierkegaard explains that this
flexible approach is a necessary ambivalence for the
ironist:
Either the ironist identifies with the nuisance
he wishes to attack, or he enters into a
relation of opposition to it, but in such a way,
of course, that he is always conscious that his
appearance is th". opposite of what he himself
subscribes to, and that he experiences a
satisfaction in this disparity. (Kierkegaard
266)
Although he never identifies with Hright, he often
appears to be praising hi.m. He frequently quotes Bright
and Harrison, but manipUlates their ""ords to serve his
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purposes. Martha Vogeler, Harrison's biographer, explains
that Arnold's use of well-known individuals:
has additional ir.terest to students of
literature because Arnold embodied much of his
criticism of England in lively sketches of his
contemporaries, thus conveying a sense of the
diversity and energy of the victorian scene such
as we get from a novel by Dickens. But like the
minor characters in Dickens' novels, these
portraits are caricatures; Arnold summed up an
individual's beliefs in a phrase or two, often a
quotation from one of ilis speeches or
pUblications. (Vogeler "Arnold and Harrison tl
441)
Vogeler's view that Arnold merely creates flat,
undeveloped caricatures for a satiric effect is not
supportable if one observes his technique carefully.
Arnold does not want his summing-up of an individual to
read as though it were a caricature: instead he wants the
portrait to seem real. In order to do this he attempts to
re-present to his readers those individuals whom society
has already, in a sense, "caricatured." In other words,
the pUblic's perception of John Bright is that he is a
progresssive Liberal whose vision is clearly set on the
future and whose ability to lead is unquestioned. Any
member of society who disagrees with Bright is thought to
be an enemy of progressive thinking. Arnold fights this
political "caricature" of John Bright, with his own
"caricature" of him. He re-presents John Bright, using
Bright's own words, in quite another way, as a mechanistic
thinker whose only utterances are those of the "political
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cant" of the day. Arnold uses Bright's statements about
education, politics, and Home Rule in Ireland to form the
representative political voice that supports everything
modern:
[Arnold asserts that]Hr. Bright, who has taken
lately to representing himself as, above all, a
promoter of reason and of the simple natural
truth of things" asserts that I'not only have the
united States thus informed Europe, but they
have done it withC'ut a grQat apparatus of higher
and scientific instruction." (17)
Bright's support for fewer institutions of higher
education and more mass education at the primary levels,
as he perceived ....as the situation in the United states, is
a political position that pleases the middle and upper
classes (Bantock). Arnold desperatelY wants people to
reconsider Bright's argument for this cause. Bright's
support for mass education for young children is, Arnold
knows, a politically expedient support that keeps the
middle and upper classes happy. They can afford to send
their own children to private schools and they believe the
only need the working and lower classes have for education
is as a place for young children to be looked after while
their parents work in a factory, as well as a place where
slightly older children can be taught to follow orders.
Arnold wants his readers to understand that Bright is
merely representing a political view. To convey that
information, though, Arnold needs to show Bright's
illogical thinking, without telling his readers that
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Bright is illogical. Arnold' 5 method for doing this is to
attack Bright on an issue, one somewhat removed from the
burning issues of the day, and one that Arnold can use to
his advantage. He also uses irony each time he introduces
Bright: "(t]hat other and greater prophet of intelligence,
and reason, and the simple natural truth of things" (33)
had said: "People who talk about what they call~
. . . mean a smattering of the two dead languages of Greek
and Latin" (39). Although many of Arnold's readers
heartily agree with Bright that culture is merely this
useless, academic exercise of knowing languages, Arnold
seizes the opportunity to turn this to his advantage:
The immense spiritual significance of the Greeks
is due to their having been inspired with this
central and happy idea of the essential
character of human perfection i and Mr. Bright's
misconception of culture, as a smattering of
Greek and Latin. comes itself, after all, from
this wonderful ~ignificance of the Greeks having
affected the very machinery of our education.
(54)
Arnold more than implies here that Bright's "misconception
of culture lt comes from thi!t very educational system that
they are both discussing. To Arnold education is often
characterized by rote memorization and drill, so he uses
the terms "machinery" and "stock notions" to express what
he believes is the result of that kind of education of
children. He further argues that Mr. Bright's concept of
culture is a stock notion because he was taught in a
"
system that educates through stock notions. In effect
Arnold is blaming the "machinery" or education for
Bright's "Ilisconception," because he is a "product"' of
that "machinery":
Mr. Bright, who has a foot in both 'Worlds, the
....orld of .iddle~class Liberalism and the world
of democracy, but ....ho brings most of hi" ideas
frail the world ot middle-class Liberalism in
which he was bred, always inclines to inculcate
that faith in machinery to which ..• English
men are so prone. (64)
According to Arnoloi, Bright is also a llIan who sees
the complexity of society as a "natural truth." The
"natural truth" of Bright's thinking causes Arnold grave
problems because he cannot attack it directly. Instead,
he links Bright to a Hebraistic view of the world, and
that view of the world to the Liberal decision-makers. The
notions of "right reason" and "simple truths" are
traditional ones that the Liberals dusted off to support
their own platforms. Their cliches make real discussion
difficult. Arnold's linking of Bright's cliches to an
outdated, narrow-JRindec:! view t.elp him to drive a wedge
between the pUblic's acceptance of cliChes, and the cliche
itself:
Mr. Bright, who loves to walk in the old ways of
the constitution. said forciblY in one;: of his
great speeches, ....hat many other people are every
day saying less forcibly, that the central idea
of English lifo and politics is the assertion of
personal liberty. (74)
When Arnold mentions the "assertion of personal liberty,"
he is pointing out that the governdlent uses this phrase to
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mask the fact that my making education voluntary, they are
saving money. Bright argues that one's personal liberty
should not be violated by government l.aws requiring one's
children be educated. Arnold uses the phrase "personal
liberty" and "natural truth" as often as he can fit them
in, in order to call attention to them, and make them
sound like cliches. Once Arnold interjects humour, or
creates cliches from the things Bright says, he can then
challenge some of Bright's more popUlar causes directly.
One of those causes is discussed in Arnold's chapter
six: "Our Liberal Practitioners." Arnold not only creates
an opportunity for the reader to re-evaluate what the
Liberals promote as a "simple natural truth," but also
shows him/her the contradiction within the Liberal::;;'
"personal liberty" platform:
The bill proposed, as everyone knows, to
prevent the land of a man who dies intestate
from going, as it goes now, to his eldest son,
and was thought, by its friends and by its
enemies, to be a step towards abating the now
almost exclusive possession of the land of this
country by the people whom we call the
Barbarians. Mr. Bright, and other speakers on
his side, seemed to hold that there is a kind of
natural law or fitness of things which assigns
to all a man's children a right to equal shares
in the enjoyment of his property after his
death; and that if. without depriving a man of
an Englishman's prime privilege of doing what he
likes by making whD.t will he chooses, you
provide that when he makes none his land shall
be divided among his family, then you give the
sanction of the law to the natural fitness of
things, and inflict a sort of check on the
present violation of this by the Barbarians.
(175)
"
In this passage Arnold plays with the concept of a
"natural truth" and "natural law" re-stimulating possible
objections to the terms that those who disapprove of
Darwin's theory of "natural selection" mi!lly have. In this
excerpt as well, Arnold attempts to show that the law
which allows a man's land to be inherited by the eldest
son is as just, or unjust, as a law that requires a man's
land to be divided after his death. He shows that Mr.
Bright and the other Liberals were supporters of nothing
more fair or more natural than what the existing system
already provided. Arnold U3es "as everyone knows" when
he begins this discussion to draw the matter into the
realm of the familiar for his readers. Later in the
discussion, he uses "doing a~ one likes," the title of one
of his chapters I to remind his readers that this was the
rallying issue of the Liberals. He calls attention to the
Liberals' notion that everyone should be able to tldo as he
likes," yet, on the Liberals' issue of property rights,
the citizen's rights to "do as he likes" are little
changed from before. Arnold effectively shows that one law
of mandatory action is merely replacing another, and that
"personal liberty" is merely an abstract notion. He
continues then to ask a series of questions:
If the almost exclusive possession of the land
of this country by the Barbarians is a bad
thing, is this practical operation of the
Liberals, and the stock notion, on which it
seems to rest, about the natural right of
children to share equally in the enjoyment of
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their father's property atter his death, the
best and most effective means of dealing with
it? Or is it best dealt .... ith by letting one's
thought and consciousness play freely and
naturally upon the Barbarians, this Liberal
operation, and the stock notion at the bottom of
it, and trying to get as near as we can to the
intelligible law of things as to each of them?
Now does anyone, if he simply and naturally
reads his consciousness, discover that he has
any rights at all? (175)
Through these questions, Arnold asks his reader to
consider fully the "rhetoric" of the Liberals. Arnold
raises the problems inherent in the issue of inheritance
because it is a good issue with ....hieh to raise questions
about the Liberals' platform. The narrator need only
present his perspective on the Liberals' issue, then ask
whether anyone has "any rights at all?" The reader can
then decide whether the "naturalness" of one solution for
dealing with property is the very same as the other. An
issue such as this, with the Liberals' attendant political
posturing, makes the proposition seem to be a "natural
truth. II The Liberals' simplification, therefore
reduction, of any issue to a "natural truth" becomes, for
Arnold, a good sUb~ect to explore and a good one to ask
his readers to question. 'through examples such as these,
Arnold encourages the reader to begin using critical
judgment.
Once the reader becomes more critically aware of the
complexity of the issues the Liberals deal with as natural
truths, Arnold works to encourage the reader to transfer
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his/her critical judgment to Bright as well. Arnold
dislikes John Bright I s ideas so much that he feels
compelled to explore repeatedly the weaknesses in Bright I s
thinking throughout the text. One of Arnold' s techniques
of exploration is showing the shabby logic that Bright
uses when he talks about the "natural fitness of things. 1I
Arnold attacks that cliche because the Liberals use it as
an answer to every difficult questic-.n. Arnold works to
dissociate it from its widespread public acceptance in
order that the pUblic might see that it does not explain
anything. By showing Bric;ht I s thinking to the reader,
Arnold reveals Bright's mechanical application of a word,
"natural, II to all situations. In so doing, J.rnold also
shows the inadequacy of the word to aid government I s
attempt to make decisions based on it. He then has, he
hopes, successfully linked the Liberals with illogical
decisions and has helped the reader through an inward
search to examine the Liberals I mechanistic "naturalness"
through the following discussion of "free trade":
Now, having first saluted free-trade. . let
us see whether even here, too, our Libera".
friends do not pursue their operations in a
mechanical way, without reference to any firm
intelligible law of things, to human life as a
whole, and human happiness; and whether it is
not more for our good . . . if, instead of
worshipping free-trade with them He:"'raistically,
as a kind of fetish, and helping them to pur.sue
it as an end in and for itself, we turn the free
stream of our thought upon their treatment of
it, and see how this is related to the
intelligible law of human life, and to national
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well-being and happiness. In short, suppose we
Hellenize a little with free-trade. (185)
Arnold realizes the only way he can dispute the Liberals'
"natural truth" is by replacing it with his method of
"inward, organic growth." When he asks the reader to turn
a "free stream of ... thought" upon the idea of
"free-trade," he is asking the reader to reconsider what
the Liberals propose as "natural." Arnold's lack of
respect for Bright's "stock notions" is apparent to the
reader because of Arnold's ironic tone. Arnold controls
the discussion through irony so that it is always an
inward search for "truth": a search that raises questions.
Arnold says that for himself "the deeper I go in my own
consciousness, and the more simply r abandon myself to it,
the more it seems to tell me that I have no rights at all,
only duties" (175). In telling the reader about his own
"inward" search, Arnold encourages the reader to follow
his model, and journey into his/her own consciousness.
Arnold's ironic presentation of Bright and Harrison
as "characters" allows the reader to see the political
platforms of these men in a different light. The view from
Arnold I 5 pespective might lead a reader to begin to see
these men as creating laws to satisfy their own economic
and political ends through the ruse of satisfying a
"natural order." As Arnold presents these men's ideas,
sometimes seeming to praise, sometimes openly attacking,
he is attempting to help thp. reader to see them with fresh
80
eyes. As ....ell, Arnold frequently engages in a "dialogue"
....ith these men, freeing the reader to observe them from a
"disintere5ted" sideline. When Arnold gives one of them
the "floor" by reproducing a segment of a past speech, the
reader is aware that immediately following the speech,
a/he will be asked to evaluate critically what is said.
Arnold often guides this evaluation with questions of his
own. His encouragement of his reader's quest:oning
attitude toward his characters' ideas requires painstaking
care because they are immensely popular with the pUblic.
If he engages in head-on debate he will be viewed by the
public as a "foppish" academic. For these reasons, he
re-conceives their statements, and provides a view of
their thinking through a different lens.
Arnold is at his rhetorical best when he is re-
conceiving Harrison's statements. Because Harrison's
intellect and wit match Arnold' 5, Arnold takes immense
satisfaction in the sparring. In an essay about culture
that Arnold wrote prior to his £2I:D.hlli essays, he draws
criticism from Harrison because, in Harrison's opinion,
Arnold is all style and no substance. Harrison, in his
reply in the Fortnightly Review, shows his concern that
Arnold is but playing with the pUblic:
I am glad we are agreed on that; a born poet, a
consummate critic. H~ may yet loosen the yoke
of the Philistine from your necks. But they
tell me of late that he [Arnold] is but playing
with the sling of David, and shoWing boys and
girls how prettily he wields it. Tell me, eta you
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think that in very truth he hates this Goliath
who oppresses you, and in his soul desires to
slay him? (Harrison 603)
Harrison is distrustful of Arnold's intentions, thinking
his social conscience is a masquerade. But Arnold will not
let Harrison insinuate that he is insincere about
spreading culture to the populace. He counters Harrison's
criticisms of his intention when he says, in culture and
~, that:
I have often spoken in praise of CUlture. I have
striven to make all my works and ways serve the
interests of culture. I take culture to be
something a great deal more than what Mr.
Frederic Harrison and others call it: "a
desirable quality in a critic of new books."
(40)
Arnold's "I take culture to be something a great deal
more" begins his long discussions of the many perspectives
from which an understanding of culture could be drawn.
Although the reader encounters these words of Harrison and
Arnold in the introduction, it is not until the chapter
"Sweetness and Light" that Arnold begine to explain the
complexity of the term culture. As a representative voice
against dilettante culture, Harrison is a well-known
figure, whose background is the educated middle-class,
much like Arnold's own. Harrison represents a learned
view, but one that in Arnold's opinion is mistaken.
Arnold's representation of the man shows him repeatedly as
someone who misunderstands the importance of culture. In
several places throughout the text, 1I.rnold quotes
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Harrison's words: "'The man of culture is in politics,'"
cried Mr. Frederic Harrison, "'one of the poorest mortals
alive'" (68); and further, Harrison said, the man of
culture has a "'turn for small faUlt-finding, love of
selfish ease, and indecision in action'" (68). Arnold's
answer to these statemants usually culminates in Arnold's
showing Harrison his misunderstanding of the issues. In
the introduction, Arnold reminds Harris-on that what Arnold
means when he talks about culture has nothing to do with
politics: "NoW for my part I do not wish to see men of
culture asking to be entrusted with power" (40). Later, in
"Sweetness and Light," Arnold again responds to Harrison's
insistence that men of culture do not belong in politics
and are only good for "professorial" tasks, by saying:
it (culture] is of use because, in presence of
the fierce exasperation which breathes, or
rather, I may say, hisses, through the whole
production in which Mr. Frederic Harrison asks
that question, it reminds us that the perfection
of human nature is sweetness and light. (68-69)
In Culture and Anarchy, Harrison represents the typical
reader of the book inasmuch as he belongs to the class,
and has the educational baCkground, of the aUdience Arnold
is addressing. For that reason, Arnold introduces again
and again what Harrison defined as culture. Arnold knows
this definition is typical among the class he most hopes
to change, and he works, through these "dialogues" with
Harrison, to involve the reader in the interchange of
opinion about what CUlture is.
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Through the interchange of opinion Arnold is also
simultaneously making the reader feel that slhe intimately
knows the "characters" of Bright and Harrison, as well as
slhe knows the narrator. His ironic phrasing, while being
instrumental to the dialectic, is also instrumental to the
reader's involvement in the "sto:-.:y." The reader becomes
familiar with Bright, "that greater prophet of
intelligence, II Or "that great Liberal." story and
dialectic become fused through Arnold's mastery of the
reader's emotional response to Bright and what Arnold has
done with Bright.
Arnold's political representatives further
demonstrate that Arnold has brought the text to a state
that could be considered a "lived experience" in so far as
they must have reminded readers of the public figures with
which they were familiar (Wells 20). His characters
engage in discus:;ions of recognizable and continuing
issues, thus bringing the text's subject into the realm of
the "typical." As Wf"'ls explains:
[t]he typical register of the text establishes
its referential power. For a text to be read as
referential, t",r contradictory relations between
the text and livo!d experience must be
established: the text must resemble the world of
the reader, and it must be intelligible. (Wells
19)
Arnold ensures that the text will resemble the world of
the reader by basing its characters and issues on the
"lived experience" of the reader. Readers recognize that
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Lord Elcho and Sir Thomas Bateson, as well as Bright and
Harrison, are public figures in Arnold's time, and they
also might suggest pUblic figures of any time. These are
men that all readers can recognize. In other ....ords, the
text refers to a real world of the nineteenth century, but
yet is still intelligible to a twentieth century reader
because the characters are universal as well as
historical. So when Arnold mentions "the Rev. w. Cattle,"
the reader of any age enjoys the satiric image of a
Reverend Cattle, even if s/he does not know that it is a
creative misspelling of Rev. Cassel (the person he means
to represent). Of these men, Arnold explains: "(they)
. . exemplify . . . the mean and the excess of
aristocratic and middle-class qualities" (99). In
representing the "mean" and the "excess" Arnold can easily
satisfy the reader's enjoyment of a humorous satire .... ith
several more satiric portraits of pUblic figures. Rather
than do this, however, he characterizes each class as it
was characterized by the other classes, through its most
obvious traits and foibles. He uses the stereotype to work
against itself. He does not favour the middle or working
classes, or the aristocracy with kind treatment. Instead,
he focuses on the deficiencies of each, making them all
appear equally defective. The working-class deficiency he
represents through the "Needy Knife-Grinder" who, he says
"may serve as to give us the notion of defect in the
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essential quality of a working class ... " (100). The
satirical names and actions of the characters he creates
as working-class representatives fulfil the reader's
expectations, as do his depictions of their personal
traits such as greediness, drunkenness, and laziness. He
satirizes the middle (Philistine), and upper (Barbarian)
classes as well. They all become equal, and familiar, in
their defects. The Philistines "we" come to know are the
class with only one idea who "are particularly stiff-
necked and perverse in the resistance to light" (101). His
use of Bright and Harrison throughout the text serves to
remind the reader of that class' s defects. The Barbarians
are possessors of "outward" culture only. For them, "it
(CUlture] consisted principally in outward gifts and
graces, in looks, manners, accomplishments, prowess"
(103). He also includes their passion for "personal
liberty, which appears to Mr. Bright the central idea of
English lifen (102). Defects such as these Arnold uses \.0
remind all of his readers of the faults and prejUdices
within society and in a small measure helps to remind
every reader of his/her own vulnerability.
As Arnold manipulates the prejUdices of each group,
he not only reveals the shallowness of the prejUdice, but
also reveals to the individual reader how incorrectly
portrayed the reader him/herself was. Through this
technique then, Arl,old deflates the stereotypes by using
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them. He encourages the reader to reconsider his prejudice
through the reader's realization that the stereotype does
not fit so well after all. The deflation and connation
of prejudices create an opportunity for the reader to
revise his/her definitions and understandings. 'J.'he reader
is, to some degree, compelled to confront "the tension
between the individual instance (his/her individual values
and beliefs] and the general notion" (Wells 21). Arnold
seems to want the individual to see self, group, and
universal in a dialectical way (Wells 22).
As we have seen, Arnold uses individuals (e.g.,
Bright, Harrison, and others) to represent or personify
belief systems within society. As wel~, he uses group
stereotypes, or universal notions, to represent or reflect
the groups' attitudes towards each other. Finally, he
uses personification and representation to make "culture"
and "anarchy" perform character-like roles. Culture is
personified as the best self of each of us. Anarchy,
although the term itself is seldom used, is clearly
represented by "machinery."
A personified culture is defined in Arnold's "simple
unsystematic way" as possessing several qualities. One of
its qualities ;s that of an unselfish impUlse toward
family and social responsibilities. specifically he says
that culture represents:
the impulses towards action, help, and
beneficence, the desire for removing human
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error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing
human misery ... (which all) come in as part
of the grounds of culture. (44)
He also includes within his definition an aspect of self-
help: "To walk staunchly by the best light one has, to be
strict and sincere with oneself" (37). These two
qualities together, one of wanting to IIdiminish human
misery, II and another of wanting an "inward" perfection,
are bC'':h needed before true culture can take root and
grow:
If culture, then, is a study of perfection, and
of harmonious perfection, general perfection,
and perfection which consists in becoming
something rather than in having something, in an
inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in
an out\;ard set of circumstances, --it is clear
that culture ... has a very important function
to fulfil for mankind. (48-49)
Arnold believes that from a striving for perfection,
culture grows in the individual. Arnold sees culture as
an organic, living thing; therefore, as I mentioned
earlier, he treats it as a hero and gives it a persona.
lie says: "Culture admits the necessity of the movement
toward fortune-making" (61) and it "does not set itself
against the games and sports" (61). On the s~'liritual side,
he adds: "Culture's way of working for reason and the will
of God is by directly trying to know more about them"
(89). Finally, of the Philistine, "CUlture," says:
Consider these people, then, their way of life,
their habits, their manners, the very tones of
their voice; look at them attentively; obser\l'e
the literature they read, ... would any amount
of wealth be worth having with the condition
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that one was to become just like these people by
having it? (52)
In short, "CUlture," as one of Arnold's characters, is
strong, moral, and perhaps slightly snobbish.
Culture's antithesis, "anarchy," however, has less
shape in the text. Anarchy is a shady character with
little definition. Yet it is a presence felt, as the evil
that lurks when good (culture) is not strong enough to
fight it. Arnold does not personify it, but allows it to
appear the same as the thing in society it represents,
"machinery. or The word "anarchy" appears in the chapter
immediately after the reader is introduced to "Sweetness
and Light." Its chapter is entitled: "Doing As One
Likes." The read~r knows that "doing as one likes" is the
Liberal catch phrase that brought approval from the
pUbliCi accordingly, placing "anarchy" within that chapter
informs the reader of the close association between
"anarchy" and the Liberals: " ..• our notion of its
being the great right and happiness of an Englishman to do
as far as possible what he likes, (is putting us] ... in
danger of drifting towards anarchy" (75). Arnold later
calls the "worship of freedom" an "anarchical tendE"ncy"
because the notion is not balanced by an equaJ.ly strong
belief in individual responsibility and critical jUdgment.
The lack of balance between rights and responsibilities
leads him to connect "anarchy" to "machinery f II because he
believes "personal liberty" is mechanistically supported
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without any thought being given to its dangers or
limitations:
More and more, because of this our blind faith
in machinery, because of our want of light to
enable us to look beyond machinery to the end
for which machinery is valuable; . . . this and
that body of men allover the country, are
beginning to assert and put in practice an
Englishman's right to do what he likes. (76)
Arnold fears that the notion that an Englishman has the
right "to do what he likes" will ultimately result in
anarchy. He associates anarchy with Il',achinery because be
believes mechanistic thinking leads to intellectual decay,
thus bringing about anarchy. "Our" resistance to anarchy
is strengthened with more "light, II and "a harmony of
ideas" (85) ; in short, it equals culture. Ar!lold' s anarchy
goes beyond a mere lack of government rule: it is a human
impoverishment. Anarchy, for Arnold, plays the role of
the evil that causes human intellectual decay. As such, it
brings about the collapse of society and turns social,
political, and educational traditions into
"machinery. "
As symbolic representatives of the good and evil
forces in society, "culture" and "anarchy" remain
necessarily fluid. The reader personally constructs, or
mediates, culture as a hero and anarchy as an evil foe.
The terms come alive as a part of the reader's "lived
experience. II Susan Wells explains that "such mediations
establish the text as a dialogue between authors and
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readers, a dialogue in ~Ihich the constraints of language
and ideology can be sUbverted" (34). When Arnold uses
political figures as characters, or turns the words
"culture" and "anarchy" into battling forces, he is not
minimizing their importance, or reducing them to
caricatures. Instead, he is giving them life in order to
make them seem tangible so that the reader can deal with
them as something concrete. The te~,t he creates involves
the reader in a process which encourages the reader to
deal intellectually with a personified culture and its
antithesis. The reader imagines Bright and Harrison in the
context in which Arnold presents them. Arnold displays
their words in an unfam1:.iar context, thereby releasing
the reader f) '1m his/her preViously held "social
construction" of them wnile compelling him/her to
reconstruct an understanding of the men and their ideas in
a new way. In order to nnderstand Bright and Harrison in a
critically conscious manner, Le., free from what they
represent as public "idols, 11 Arnold believes he needs to
reproduce "what everyone knows" about them, but reproduce
it in a manner that provides the reader with an
opportunity to mediate, or rethink, "what everyone knows."
The mediation allows the reader to accept the character as
a "true" representation, but at the same time Arnold,
working through irony, changes what is "true." Susan
Wells explains the difficult process of creating a "true"
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or "typical" character which is still a representative
The type character might stand, then, as an
example of the typical's direct resemblance to
lived experience. But of course, things are not
so simple. When we want to dismiss a character
as unrealistic, wooden, or purely literary, we
describe hi'lll or her as "just a type." We
acknowledge, in this description that un-
reflected social experience is not, after all,
very good experience, and tt.at we demand some
kind of mediation, some trails formation of what
everyone knows, before we are Willing to accept
an image as true. (Wells 21)
Although many of Arnold's readers probablY dismiss his
characters as It just types," he in fact uses nlany
rhetorical strategies to anticipate that reaction. One of
his most intricate strategies is his use of the
representative figure as a transformative device.
In this chapter I have explored Arnold's rhetorical
strategy for representing both human figures and symbols.
His strategy demands froll the reader a high level of
awareness and involvement with the text. with Arnoldts
prose it is easy to fear, as Schiller feared of Goethe Is
....ork, that many readers ....ill believe they understand the
text because they understand its anecdotes and
stereotypes, when in fact, they have merely understood its
surface and not begun to und"rstand the subtext.
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CONCLUSION
Within culture and Anarchy Matthew Arnold raises
important questions about social and political issues by
using a rhetorical method that encourages the reader to
become involved in the text. Arnold's method for involving
the reader relies heavily on two strategies, both of which
evolved from the Bildungsroman, a genre that assumes that
the role of narrator and the role of reader are active
ones. The two strategies within his method are his
courtship of the audience and his creation of
representative characters. Both of these strategies
demand that the narrator interacts with the reader,
appealing to and addressing him/her throughout the text.
These techniques, although observable in others I
works, are uniquely applied in Arnoldts~
Aruu:£lri (Landow 51-57). He is not another Carlyle, or
Newman, or Ruskin. Richard Ohmann has suggested that a
difference arises because "Arnold and his associates write
in a society where no cOIDIllon framework of feelings and
assumptions can be taken for granted, and their prose
strains to provide the framework," (303) each attempting
to provide it in his own way. John Holloway suggests that
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Arnold's particular framework is the "~ .fnmg" or "the
desirable tellper ot mind in which to conduct an enquiry"
(215) •
In 7:1'1 discussion of Arnold' s .ork, I have shown that
he creates a dialectic. which becomes his frallework. This
dialectic he achieves by continuously suggesting to his
readers that the philosophies of Hebraism and Hellenism
are not poles apart, but are one and the same. His
readers then must take their own positions against
Arnold's view. creating a dialectic. He conducts the
dialogue as a courtship between his reader and himself in
a friendly and accommodating tone that allows him to
preserve in his reader a "desirable temper of m.ind."
Arnold created his unique style under the influence
of European writers rather than British writers. His
greatest affinity was for the works of Goethe, an
innovative stylist himself. Arnold's CUlture and Anarchy
exhibits Arnold's own adaptation of aany of Goethe's
techniques.
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NOTES
1 The edition of Culture and Anarchy that I refer to,
and quote from is J. Dover Wilson's reprint of the 1869
edition. I chose to use it because it was Arnold's first
revision of the essays into book form and was thus closer
to his original impulse to express the ideas contained in
the book.
2 Arnold's essays in~ that comprise Culture
and Anarchy were unavailable to me; I therefore used E.K.
Brown's account of Arnold's textual changes to support my
discussion in chapter one.
3 According to Alden and Shaffner, the Bildungsroman
has )-. - lme synonymous with novels of self-education and
"app:t::l.....c.iceship." It is usually used to describe a "kind
of novel which flourished in France and England as well as
Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" (Alden
1). The Bildungsroman generally has a hero who is the
prime mOver in his/her own "organic development" (Shaffner
IS). Although culture and Anarchy is clearly not a novel,
and does not have a hero, it does contain many of the
features that Shaffner lists as necessary to the
Bildungsroman such as the belief that a person can become
a master of his/her own fate, a strong belief in choice in
a person'f:' life, and an affirmative attitude toward life
as a wh(" >~, Arnold as narrator expresses these ideals
and enc ~ .. .. the reader to adopt them and become the
hero 01 'I i ". : ,··r own life.
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